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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

PlaintiffAppellant,

)
)
)

-vsTAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,

Supreme Court No. 44617-2016

)
)
)

DefendantRespondent

)

)

Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.

HONORABLE GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH, Presiding

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720

Attorney for Appellant

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender,
322 East Front Street, Suite 570, Boise, Idaho 83702

Attorney for Respondent

1

Time: 10:59 AM
Page 1 of 3

User: WALDEMER

Third Judicial District Court - Canyon County

Date: 12/20/2016

ROA Report
Case: CR-2016-0012011-C Current Judge: George A. Southworth
Defendant: Fairchild, Taylor James

State of Idaho vs. Taylor James Fairchild

Felony
Judge

Date
New Case Filed-Felony

George A. Southworth

Affidavit Of Probable Cause

Robert L Jackson

Criminal Complaint

Robert L Jackson

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 07/11/2016 01 :32 PM)

Robert L Jackson

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 07/11/2016
01 :32 PM: Arraignment/ First Appearance

Robert L Jackson

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 07/11/2016
01 :32 PM: Constitutional Rights Warning

Robert L Jackson

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 07/11/2016
01 :32 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender

Robert L Jackson

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 07/11/2016
01:32 PM: Commitment On Bond - $10,000

Robert L Jackson

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 07/11/2016
01 :32 PM: Upon Posting Bond - Report to Pre-Trial Release

Robert L Jackson

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 07/11/2016
01 :32 PM: Notice Pretrial Release Services

Robert L Jackson

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 07/22/2016 08:30 AM)

Gary D. DeMeyer

7/12/2016

Request For Discovery

Gary D. DeMeyer

7/13/2016

PA Response and Objection to Request For Discovery

Gary D. DeMeyer

Request For Discovery

Gary D. DeMeyer

Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi

Gary D. DeMeyer

7/11/2016

7/22/2016

Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 07/22/2016 08:30 AM: Gary D. DeMeyer
Preliminary Hearing Held
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 07/22/2016 08:30 AM: Gary D. DeMeyer
Order Binding Defendant Over to District Court
Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 08/05/2016 09:00 AM)

Davis F. VanderVelde

PA's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

George A. Southworth

Information

George A. Southworth

7/25/2016

Motion to Produce Preliminary Hearing Transcript (with order)

George A. Southworth

7/27/2016

Order to Produce Preliminary Hearing Transcript

George A. Southworth

8/5/2016

Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 08/05/2016 09:04 AM: Gregory M Culet
Hearing Held
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 08/05/2016 09:04 AM: Gregory M Culet
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Christine Rhodes
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
pages
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 08/05/2016 09:04 AM: Gregory M Culet
Arraignment / First Appearance
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 08/05/2016 09:04 AM: Gregory M Culet
Appear & Plead Not Guilty - stnw
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 08/05/2016 09:04 AM: Gregory M Culet
Notice Of Hearing
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User: WALDEMER

ROA Report
Case: CR-2016-0012011-C Current Judge: George A. Southworth
Defendant: Fairchild, Taylor James

State of Idaho vs. Taylor James Fairchild

Felony
Date
8/5/2016

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 10/03/2016 09:00 AM)

George A. Southworth

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/01/2016 09:00 AM)

George A. Southworth

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/12/2016 09:00 AM)

Juneal C. Kerrick

PA's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Juneal C. Kerrick

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/12/2016 09:06 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
pages

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/12/2016 09:06 AM:
Hearing Held

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/12/2016 09:06 AM:
Motion Bond REduction Held

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/12/2016 09:06 AM:
Motion Granted

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/12/2016 09:06 AM:
Order Release to Pre-trial Release Program

Gregory M Culet

8/17/2016

PA's Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

George A. Southworth

8/26/2016

Transcript Filed (Preliminary Hearing 7-22-16)

George A. Southworth

9/2/2016

Motion To Suppress Evidence Pursuant To Idaho Criminal Rule 12 (no
order)

George A. Southworth

9/13/2016

Notice Of Hearing on Motion To Suppress

George A. Southworth

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/12/2016 03:30 PM) mtn to
suppress

George A. Southworth

Brief In Support of Motion To Suppress Evidence

George A. Southworth

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/07/201611:00 AM) mtn to
suppress - BLOCK 1 HOUR

George A. Southworth

8/12/2016

9/20/2016

Order Resetting Case

George A. Southworth

9/27/2016

Objection to Motion to Suppress Evidence

George A. Southworth

10/3/2016

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 10/03/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing
Held PCS {F}
JT 11/1 GAS

George A. Southworth

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 10/03/2016 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: PAtricia Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

George A. Southworth

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Suppress

George A. Southworth

10/6/2016

PA's Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

George A. Southworth

10/7/2016

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/07/2016 11 :00 AM:
Hearing Held mtn to suppress - UNDER ADVISEMENT

George A. Southworth
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Date: 12/20/2016

Third Judicial District Court - Canyon County

Time: 10:59 AM

User: WALDEMER

ROA Report

Page 3 of 3

Case: CR-2016-0012011-C Current Judge: George A. Southworth
Defendant: Fairchild, Taylor James

State of Idaho vs. Taylor James Fairchild

Felony
Date

Judge

10/7/2016

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/07/2016 11 :00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Patricia Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

George A. Southworth

10/11/2016

Affidavit of Eric Phillips In Support of the State's Objection to Motion to
Suppress Evidence

George A. Southworth

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 10/31/2016 01:00 PM}

George A. Southworth

Supplement to Objection to Motion to Suppress Evidence

George A. Southworth

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence

George A. Southworth

10/26/2016

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to
Suppress

George A. Southworth

10/31/2016

Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 10/31/2016 01:00 PM: George A. Southworth
Hearing Held

10/13/2016

Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 10/31/2016 01:00 PM: George A. Southworth
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Patricia Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 11/01/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing George A. Southworth
Vacated
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 11/28/2016 01 :30 PM}

George A. Southworth

Notice of Appeal

George A. Southworth

Appealed To The Supreme Court

George A. Southworth

11/18/2016

Copies

George A. Southworth

11/28/2016

Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 11/28/2016 01 :30 PM: George A. Southworth
Hearing Held

11/14/2016

Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 11/28/2016 01 :30 PM: George A. Southworth
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Patricia Terry
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 11/28/2016 01 :30 PM: George A. Southworth
Order To Release On Own Recognizance
12/2/2016

Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public Defender (w/order}

George A. Southworth

12/8/2016

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender

George A. Southworth
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ID~ STATE OF IDAHO
\ ~

¥

2016

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
M.NYE,OEPUTY

Plaintiff

.V

l:!,t )~M.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT odrtrn A~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
'
~
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
JUL 1 1

C~':Jled 06/03// 5

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD

Defendant.
Case No.

DOB:

C,//111-

/c:i,~1/

SSN:
OLN:

Agency Case No.

16-1727 5

State: IOAHO

IE. PHILLIPS #133

-~---------- ofthe

CALDWELL POLICE DEPARTMENT

being first duly sworn,

state that the following is true and accurate. The following acts occured at: LASTER LN. & LATHROP AVE. CALDWELL
Canyon County, State ofldaho.
Alleged Crime(s) Occurred at 0855

on the date of: 07-08-2016

Crime(s) alleged to have been committed

(F) POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE I.C. 37-2732(C)1

1. Please state what you did or observed that gives you reason to believe the individual(s) committed the crime(s) alleged:
On 07-08-2016, at approximately 0846 hours, I was dispatched to the area of Laster Ln. and Lathrop Ave. in the City Of
Caldwell, County Of Canyon, State Of Idaho for a report of a suspicious circumstance. While en-route, CCSO dispatch
advised that two males had been sitting in a red Dodge Ram for approximately ten minutes. A male showed up in a green
passenger car and got in the red truck. I began running the license plates the caller had identified as being at the location.
The black 1999 Hyundia Accent (2060718) returned to Jessie Andrew Blount (DOB
. The red Dodge Ram
(135GSC)(Oregon plate) belonged to Philip Daniel Wietz (DOB
. I am familiar with Philip due to a suicidal call
that his grandmother had called in on 03-19-2016. Philip was placed on a mental hold and I seized multiple drug and drug
paraphernalia items from his residence. I had seized drugs and a pistol from his red Dodge Ram with the same license
plate. Due to the call comments and my previous experience with Philip, I had suspicion that a possible drug transaction or
use of drugs was taking place. I parked at Hobart Ave. and Laster Ln. to standby for an assist unit. While parked, I
observed the red Dodge Ram begin driving westbound from Laster Ln., down a dirt road to Indiana Ave. quickly. The black
Hyundia began driving towards me on Laster Ln. eastbound. As the car approached I activated my overhead lights and
shut them off to get the attention of the male driver. I stuck my hand out the window to motion to the
op. As I
drove up to the vehicle and it stopped, I observed a male identified as Taylor James Fairchild (DOB
in the
drivers seat. He was wearing a hat with "420" on the front. I asked the male for his identification and where he was coming
from. Taylor was staying the night at his friends house. I advised Taylor of why I was there. Taylor initially denied that he
knew who was in the red truck. I ran Taylor's information through CCSO dispatch and dispatch advised he had an arrest
warrant. I asked him if he was on probation and Taylor said he was for paraphernalia. Taylor admitted to using pot three
days ago and meth a few weeks ago. I had Taylor step out of the vehicle due to the report of the arrest warrant. I had
Taylor place his hands on top of the vehicle so I could check him for weapons and contraband prior to applying handcuffs.
In Taylor's front right pocket, I located two clear plastic baggies with a white crystal substance in both baggies. Through my
experience and training I recognized the white crystal substance to be methamphetamine.
2. What further information do you have regarding what others did or observed giving you reasonable grounds to believe
that the individual(s) committed the crime(s) alleged?
After reading Taylor the Miranda warning, he admitted to buying $10.00 worth of methamphetamine from Philip Weitz. He
paid with two $5.00 bills. He had been communicating with Philip by Facebook. I tested one of the baggies of the white
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-

crystal substance with NARK II test kit ##15 test kit. The substance tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine.

3. Set out any information you have and its source as to why a warrant instead of a summons should be issued.
In custody.

"I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State ofldaho that the foregoing is true and correct."

Dated this

m

~

Signature of Officer
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16-6503

---A.M, 1

JUL 11 2016

-

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
M.NYE,DEPUTY

es/dm
BRYAN F. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR 2016---")~2{)c.-=.-\.......\ _ __
Plaintiff,
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
vs.

TAYLO
D.O.B.

MES FAIRCHILD

POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
Felony, I.C. §37-2732(c)(l)

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
ss

County of Canyon

)

PERSONALLY APPEARED before me this

~etl/,u, c,~we u

Il!*

day of July, 2016,

, of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, who being

duly sworn, complains and says:

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

7

"'16-6503
That the Defendant, Taylor James Fairchild, on or about the 8th day of July, 2016, in the County
of Canyon, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance.
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732(c)(l) and against the power, peace and
dignity of the State of Idaho.

ComplaiJant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 11th day of July, 2016.

2
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

8

•

•

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
181 ARRAIGNMENT
181 IN-CUSTODY
O SENTENCING / CHANGE OF PLEA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff

-vsTaylor James Fairchild

Defendant.

D True Name

) Case No. CR-2016-12011-C
)
) Date: July 11, 2016
)
) Judge: Jackson
)

Corrected Name:

)
)

Recording: Mag7 (357-403)

APPEARANCES:

Defendant
Defendant's Attorney Tera Harden

181 Prosecutor Dallin Creswell
D Interpreter

ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: Defendant

121 was

informed of the charges against him/her and all legal rights, including the right to be represented by
counsel.
181 requested court appointed counsel.
181 lndigency hearing held.
181 Court appointed public defender.
18iPRELIMINARY HEARING:

[8l Preliminary Hearing set

BAIL:

Statutory time waived: OYes 181No
July 22, 2016 at 8:30am

D Preliminary Hearing Waived
before Judge DeMeyer

State recommends bond be set at $10,000 with Pretrial Release conditions

D Released on written citation promise to appear
D Released on own recognizance (O.R.)
D Released to pre-trial release officer.
D No Contact Order D entered D continued

OAddress Verified
D Corrected Address:

D Released on bond previously posted.

181 Remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
181 Bail set at $10,000
D Cases consolidated
181 Defendant to Report to Pretrial Release Services
upon posting bond.

OTHER: Ms. Harden requested that bond be set at $5,000 with Pretrial Release conditions.

__e£y~-'---M___..S____,, Deputy Clerk

07/2009

ARRAIGNMENT/ FIRST APPEARANCE

9

•

•

FILED 7 ·II·! b
AT 4~03f?.M.
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

BY
)
)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO/or

TaJ,Jfor J&nes Fairehild

_________________

)

J?xva_ns
Case No.

,Deputy

CR..201 b-J 20J/C

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC
DEFENDER

)

)

The Court being fully advised as to the application of the above-named applicant and it appear.ing to
be a proper case,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender be, and hereby is, appointed for

pre/im

on

Julia 22.20/b a-ts:wam

){THEMATTERISSETFOR
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _betoreJudge

0 THE MATTER SHALL BE SET FOR

Dated:

DeMe'jer

.

-----------------

1 · 11 · I b

o'-__oo
______

~ In Custody- Bond $~).....
D,__,
O.R.
D on bond previously posted ·
D to PreTrial Release

1J' Released: D
Juvenile:

D In Custody
D Released to

---------------

D No Contact Order entered.
D Cases consolidated.

D Discovery provided by State.
D Interpreter required.
D Additional charge of FTA
Original--Court File

Yellow--Public Defender

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC
DEFENDER

Pink--Prosecuting Attorney

2/06

10

•

•

·,I· lb

AT4:o3PM.
FILED 1
CBYLER~JR~TRICT COURT
--~----~vv----1J_....__ _ _ _ __.,DEPUTY

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

Case No.

Cf2.2Dlb- I 20 I IC

ORDER FOR

D Conditional Release/Pretrial Services
D Release on Own Recognizance
D Commitment on Bond

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant abide by the following conditions of release:

D Defendant is Ordered released
D On own recognizance

D

~ d having been set In the sum of$ /

D Bond having been D increased

D

Placed on probation

D)

D

Case Dismissed

~ Total Bond

o-o)

reduced to the sum o f $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

D Total Bond

Upon posting bond, defendant must report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services office as stated below:
e endant shall report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services Office and follow the standard reporting conditions:

valid prescription .
Not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or mood altering substances without a.....____;...-Submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol and/or drugs as requested by P7trial Services at defendant's expense.

D Not operate or be in the driver's position of any motor vehicle.

/ /-

u__,

~t

D Abide by any No Contact Order and its conditions.
D Submit to D GPS D

Alcohol monitoring as directed by Pretrial Services.
Defendants Ordered to submit to GPS or alcohol monitoring shall make arrangements with a provider
approved by Pretrial Services, prior to release.

OTHER: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Failure by defendant to comply with the rules and/or reporting conditions and/or requirements of release as
Ordered by the Court may result In the revocation of release and return to the custody of the Sheriff.

Dated:

/

l · l I · I k2

}8(White - Court

Judge

JZi"Yellow - Jail/Pretrial Services
11

.,)ir,ink - Defendant

10/11

/

•
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
PRELIMINARY HEARING
STATE OF IDAHO

) Case No. CR-2018-12011-C
Plaintiff )
) Date: July 22, 2016
)
Defendant. ) Judge: Gary D. Demeyer
)
) Recording: Mag 2 (900-917)
)

-vsTAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD
OTrueName
Corrected Name:
APPEARANCES:
I&! Defendant
181 Prosecutor Patrick Denton

181 Defendant's Attorney
D Interpreter

Ryanl Dowell

PROCEEDINGS:
~ Preliminary hearing held.
STATE'S WITNESSES SWORN:
3.

1. ERIK PHILLLIPS
4.

2.
5.

DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES SWORN:

1.

2.
5.

a
~
181 Defendant had no testimony or evidence to present.

STATES EXHIBIT 1 ADMITTED:

181

As set forth on attached list.

COURT'S RULING:
IZ! Probable cause found for offense set forth in Complaint.
181 Defendant held to answer to the District Court. DISTRICT COURT ARRAIGNMENT SET AUGUST 51
2018 @ 9:00 A.M. BEFORE HONORABLE JUDGE VANDERVELDE.
D Misdemeanor case(s) continued consolidated with felony case for further proceedings.
181 Motion for bond reduction continued until the time of District Court Arraignment.
BAIL: The Defendant was continued
-n
Released on written citation promise to appear
D Released on own recognizance

D Released to pre-trial release officer.

D Released on bond previously posted.
181 Remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
181 Bail as set at $10,000
181 Defendant to Report to Pretrial Release Services
upon posting bond.

OTHER: _ _

PRELIMINARY HEARING

07/2009
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Third Judicial District c:61, State of Idaho
In and For the Coullly of Canyon

Filed:~at

1115 Albany Street

9/21:.

M

Clerk o

Caldwell, Idaho 83605
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

)

ei:{&J/~-126 I/-(:_,

)
)

Case No:

)

ORDER BINDING DEFENDANT OVER TO
DISTRICT COURT

)
)

)
)

D waived

}(held

in this case on the

?Z.,IJl__day of

and the Court being fully satisfied that a public offense has been
co

itted and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe the Defendant guilty thereof,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant herein be held to answer in the District Court
Judicial District of The State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, to the charge of .l:{..:.F..L..L~WJj~U...

"'(}J;Jk~~w'tu,d/·

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant herein shall be arraigned before the District Court of
dicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, on the

- ~ ~ - _ , 20/lP
D

~

day of

9/:hJ a.m.fttukrMiJe./«d[:R

at

Defendant is continued released on the bond posted.

ulfJ4(_~

D continued D ordered.

Defendant's personal recognizance release is

Defendant's release to Pre-Trial Release Officer is gcontinued

'-o/l°"- ~~bp/.

D ordered.

YOU, THE SHERIFF OF CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, are commanded to receive into your
custody and detain the Defendant until legally discharged. Defendant is to be admitted to bail in
the sum of $I~, 1),01()
(/4£

Id

Dated:

7/~/4

Signed

~

Magistra

/

c_..---

ORDER BINDING DEFENDANT OVER TO DISTRICT COURT

13
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J,(2

,,.-

05/2007

,.

F I A.~ 45) q,_M.

•

J

ba

JUL 2 2 2016
BRYANF. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
B DOMINGUEZ. DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2016-12011
Plaintiff,
INFORMATION
vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD
D.O.B.

POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
Felony, LC. §37-2732(c)(l)

Defendant.

BRYAN F. TAYLOR, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Canyon,
State of Idaho, who in the name and by authority of said state prosecutes in its behalf, in proper
person comes into the above entitled Court and informs said Court that the above name
Defendant stands accused by this Information of crime of
POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Felony
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(l)
committed as follows:

INFORMATION

1

14

•

That the Defendant, Taylor James Fairchild, on or about the 8th day of July, 2016, in the
County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit:
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732(c)(l) and against the power,
peace and dignity of the State ofldaho.

DATED this 22nd day of July, 2016.

DALLIN CRESWELL for
BRYANF. TAYLOR
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho

INFORMATION
2

15

-

..

·a~

JUL 2 5 2016

JD

Ryan K. Dowell, Deputy Public Defender, ISB #7796
Marc Bybee, Deputy Public Defender, ISB #9245
Tera A. Harden, Chief Public Defender, ISB #6052
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave, Suite 120
Caldwell, ID 83605
Telephone: 208-649-1818
Facsimile: 208-649-1819
Email: rdowell@canyonco.org

E DP.M.

CANYON COUNTY CLERK

M.NYE,OEPUTY

Attorneys for the Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2016-12011

vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD

MOTION TO PRODUCE PRELIMINARY
ARING TRANSCRIPT

Defendant.

COMES NOW, TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD, the defendant above-named, by and
through counsel, Ryan K. Dowell, Canyon County Public Defender's Office, and moves this
honorable court for an Order to produce the record of preliminary hearing held in this matter on
the 22nd day of July, 2016 in front of the Honorable Judge Gary D. Demeyer leading to the filing
of the Information in this matter.

MOTION TO PRODUCE PRELIMINARY TRANSCRIPTS, CR-2016-12011- PG. 1

16

THIS MOTION is made pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure
5.2.
DATED this 25th day of July. 2016

Ryan Dowell. Deputy Public Defender
Attorney for the Defendant

MOTION TO PRODUCE PRELIMINARY TRANSCRIPTS, CR-2016-12011- PG. 2

17

•

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 25th day of July, 2016, a copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
PRODUCE PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT was served on the following named
persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[x] Hand Delivery-Court Mailbox
[ ] Electronic Mail

Clerk of the Court-Criminal Proceeding
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street, Rm 201
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[x] Hand Delivery
[ ] Electronic Mail

DATED this 25th day of July, 2016.

Canyon County Public Defender's Office
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JD

Ryan K. Dowell, Deputy Public Defender, ISB #7796
Tera A. Harden, Chief Public Defender, ISB #6052
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave, Suite 120
Caldwell, ID 83605
Telephone: 208-649-1818
Facsimile: 208-649-1819
Email: rdowell@canyonco.org

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
B DOMINGUEZ, DEPUTY

Attorneys for the Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2016-12011

vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD

RDERTOPRODUCEPRELIMINARY

ARING TRANSCRIPT

Defendant.

The above named Defendant having filed a Motion for an Order to produce the record of
the Preliminary Hearing of the above named Defendant, good cause appearing and under
authority of Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 therefore;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER a transcript of the Preliminary
Hearing proceedings be prepared within 30 days of the filing of this Order and delivered to the
Court, prosecuting attorney and defense counsel thereafter, to be prepared by the court reporter
assigned at that hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that:

ORDER TO PRODUCE PRELIMINARY TRANSCRIPTS, CR-2016-12011- PG. 1
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Based upon Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 the defendant has previously been determined by a
court to indigent as the public defender was appointed and therefore order the payment of the
preliminary hearing transcript to be conducted at county expense.

/Ja-}1y ~,
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
· I hereby certify that on the :J7 day of :;$y,\~
, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document, ORDER TO PRODU E PRELIMINARY HEARING
TRANSCRIPT, upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
17fBy depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail.
~ By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class.
D By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below.
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number:
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

r:¥B y depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail.
D By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class.

D By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below.
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number:
Canyon County Public Defender
111 N. 11 th Ave, Ste 120
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

~ y depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail.
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class.
D By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below.
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number:

D

Transcript Clerk
Canyon County Courthouse
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court

BF

~~-

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING:

GREGORY M. CULET DATE: August 5, 2016

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)

COURT MINUTES

)

CASE NO: CR2016-12011*C

)
vs.

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

)

)
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

)
)

REPORTED BY: Christine Rhodes

)

DCRT 5 (10:20-10:25)

)

This having been the time heretofore set for arraignment in the above entitled
matter, the State was represented by Mr. Matthew Bever, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
for Canyon County and the defendant was present in court with counsel, Mr. Scott
Gatewood
The Court called the case and determined the defendant's true name was
charged.

The Court advised the defendant· of the charge in the above referenced

case and possible penalties for the same.
The Court determined the defendant had received a copy of the Information and
waived formal reading of the same.

In answer to Court's inquiry, the defendant

indicated he understood the nature of the charge and the maximum possible penalties.

COURT MINUTES
August 5, 2016

Page 1
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In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Gatewood indicated the defendant would
enter a plea of not guilty and demand speedy trial.
The Court set this matter for pretrial conference the 3rd day of October 2016
at 9:00 a.m. and a three day jury trial commencing the 1st day of November 2016 at
9:00 a.m., both before Judge Southworth. The Court inquired regarding the issue of

bail.
Mr. Gatewood advised the Court he had no notes in his file regarding bond and
requested a set over to next week for the motion.
The Court set this matter for a bond reduction motion the 12th day of August
2016 at 9:00 a.m. before this Court.

The defendant was remanded to the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff
pending further proceedings or the posting of bond.

Deputy Clerk

COURT MINUTES
August 5, 2016
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CULET DATE: AUGUST 12, 2016

THE STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
,)

COURT MINUTES
CASE NO: CR-2016-12011-C
TIME: 9:00 AM.
REPORTED BY: Kathy Klemetson

_____________
Defendant.

DCRT 5 (1225-1229)

This having been the time heretofore set for motion for bond reduction in the
above entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Christopher Boyd, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, and the defendant appeared in court with
counsel, Mr. Scott Gatewood.
The Court called the case, noted the matter was set for defendant's motion for
bond reduction.
Mr. Gatewood presented argument in support of the motion and requested the
Court release the defendant on his own recognizance. Mr. Gatewood noted the
·defendant is currently being supervised on misdemeanor probation in Bingham County.
Mr. Boyd submitted to the Court's discretion and noted the State had no specific
objection.

COURT MINUTES
AUGUST 12, 2016

1
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The Court expressed views and granted the motion and released the defendant
on his own recognizance to report to Pre Trial Release Services.

COURT MINUTES
AUGUST 12, 2016
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

•
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~ ~ ~ I S + R I C T COURT

)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

)

)
)
)

Case No.

• DEp{JTY

re-1£-\?,Q\ \ -C_.,J

OR~FOR
~onditional Release/Pretrial Services
D Release on Own Recognizance
D Commitment on Bond

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant abide by the following conditions of release:

~fondant Is Ordered released

){en

own recognizance

D

Placed on probation

D

Case Dismissed

D Bond having been set in the sum of$ ------- D Total Bond
D Bond having been D increased D reduced to the sum of$ _ _ _ _ _ __

D Total Bond

D Upon posting bond, defendant must report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services office as stated below:

?56:efendant shaU report to the canyon County Prebial Services Office and folow the standard reporting conditions:
~Comply with a curfew designated by the Court or standard curfew set by Pretrial Services _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
~ o t consume or possess alcoholic beverages or mood altering substances without a valid prescription.
~ubmit to evidentiary testing for alcohol and/or drugs as requested by Pretrial Services at defendant's expense.

D Not operate or be in the driver's position of any motor vehicle.
D Abide by any No Contact Order and its conditions.
D Submit to D GPS D Alcohol monitoring as directed by Pretrial Services.
Defendants Ordered to submit to GPS or alcohol monitoring shall make arrangements with a provider
approved by Pretrial Services, prior to release.
OTHER: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Failure by defendant to comply with the rules and/or reporting conditions and/or requirements of release as
Ordered by the Court may result In the revocation of release and return to the custody Of the Sheriff.

~hite - Court

~allow - Jail/Pretrial Services
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RYAN K. DOWELL, Deputy Public Defender
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave., Suite 120
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: 208-649-1818
Facsimile: 208-649-1819
Idaho State Bar # 7796
rdowell@canyonco.org

CANYON OOUNTV CLERK
C JIMENEZ, DEPUTY

Attorneys for the Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR-2016-12011-C

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
PURSUANT TO IDAHO
RULE 12

vs.
TAYLOR FAIRCHILD,

EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through the Canyon County Public Defender,
Ryan K. Dowell, hereby moves this Honorable Court for an ORDER, pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 12(b), suppressing evidence on the grounds that it was illegally obtained. This motion is
for the reason that the State's evidence, including the statements of the Defendant, were seized
without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article 1. § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Defendant respectfully requests oral argument and
evidentiary hearing.
DATED September 1, 2016

Ryan K. Dowell
Attorney for the Defendant

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ly

I hereby certify that on September~,, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
X By depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail.
D By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class.
D By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below.
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number:
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Ryan K. Dowell, Attorney for Defendant

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 2
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RYAN K. DOWELL, Deputy Public Defender
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave., Suite 120
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: 208-649-1818
Facsimile: 208-649-1819
Idaho State Bar # 7796
rdowell@canyonco.org
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CANYON COUNTY OL.1-.,-;
C JIMENEZ, D!IIUTY

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO.CR-2016-12011-C

Plaintiff,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.
TAYLOR FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through the Canyon County Public
Defender, Ryan K. Dowell, and submits a BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

All of the facts as provided herein come directly from Officer Phillips's
(hereinafter Officer) report along with Officer Phillips testimony at the preliminary
hearing on this case. On 7/8/16 a call was made to the police regarding odd behavior in
which two men were sitting in a Dodge Ram whereby one of the men pulled up in a
passenger car (Hyundai) and they were sitting alongside the road in the Ram pickup. The
caller provided license plate numbers for both vehicles. While enroute Officer ran the
plates for both vehicles. The Officer had previous contacts with the "owner" of the

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 1
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Dodge Ram, to wit Philip Wietz. That prior contact involved Mr. Wietz as being suicidal
and having possession of drugs and a firearm. When the Officer arrived he witnessed the
Dodge Ram drive away. The Officer did not identify the driver of that vehicle. The
driver of the Hyundai drove directly towards the Officer. The Officer thereafter turned
on his overhead lights to stop the Hyundai and also stuck out his arm to waiver the driver
of the Hyundai to stop.

At the preliminary hearing the officer conceded he was

"stopping" this vehicle and that he had not observed the driver of this vehicle violate any
traffic laws. It should be reiterated that the officer had not identified any individuals and
did not observe any law violation when he stopped this vehicle.
The defendant was identified as the driver of the Hyundai. The defendant had an
active warrant for his arrest, a search of his person was completed, a crystal like
substance was obtained, and the defendant was charged with the offenses in this case.

LEGAL BASIS FOR SUPRESSION
1. Probable cause is required to stop or pull over a motor vehicle based upon
the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
There are three (3) types of contacts between law enforcement and private
individuals, including (1) consensual encounters which is not a seizure and no
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justification is required; (2)

•

stop/investigative detention justified by reasonable

suspicion; and (3) actual arrests justified by probable cause. State v. Holcomb, 128
Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct.App. 1995); State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d
1237 (Ct.App. 1992); and State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 815 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991).
Whenever an officer stops an individual and restrains their freedom, even
momentarily, that person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore, the stop and detention must comply with the constitutional standards of
reasonableness. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); Matter of Clayton, 113
Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); and State v. Waldie, 126 864, 893 P.2d 811
(Ct.App. 1995). The stop and detention of a suspect is justifiable under the Fourth
Amendment only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, that the suspect has been, is, or is about to engage in criminal activity.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975); State v. Benefiel,

131 Idaho 226, 953 P.2d 976 (1998); and State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237,939 P.2d 556
(1997). The stop must be based on more than mere speculation, inarticulated hunches or
instinct. See Terry; State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 953 P.2d 645 (Ct.App. 1998); and
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661,664, 809 P.2d 522,525 (Ct.App. 1991).

Ordinary and routine traffic stops are a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and therefore, the stop must be based on reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the vehicle is being driven in violation of the traffic laws or that the vehicle or an
occupant has been or is about to engage in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979);
and State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (1999). Moreover, a reasonable
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suspicion requires more than a "'mere hunch' or 'inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion."' State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203, 1211 (2009); (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415, 110 L.ed.2d 301, 308
(1990)). Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on the particular facts surrounding
the stop.

It is well established law that an individual has a reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy where there is a subjective expectation of privacy in the area
searched or seized and society is willing to accept the subjective expectation of privacy.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979); Katz v. United States, 289 U.S.
347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); and State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 893 P :2d 806 (Ct.App.
1995). Generally the driver of a vehicle has standing to contest the reasonableness of an
investigatory stop as well as the continued detention. State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405,
679 P.2d 1123 (1984).
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, thus if it is established that the warrantless search or
seizure infringed on an individual's legitimate privacy interest, the state must show that
the search or seizure fell within the delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); and State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 900
P.2d 196 (1995). Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); and State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). In
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summary, the evidence acquired as a result of a constitutionally impermissible search or
seizure will be excluded unless the causal connection between the seizure and the
acquisition has been broken. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407
(1963); and State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 787 P.2d 231 (1990).
2. Reasonable suspicion did not exist to stop the defendant

In the case before the court the officer provided his reasons for stopping the
defendant in his report. A call had been received by dispatch that a "green passenger" car
and a red Dodge Ram truck were stopped on a dirt road adjacent to (fill in). The caller
indicated that a male got out of the "green" car and got into the truck and, further, that the
two men had been in the truck for about "ten minutes." The caller provided the license
plate number of at least one, if not both cars. There was no further clarification as to how
long after the incident the caller called dispatch. No other information was relayed in the
call.
Officer Phillips arrived at the location and confirmed that a red Dodge Ram was
present and a black, not green, Hyundai. Whatever license plate information that was
provided by the caller matched at least the truck, if not the Hyundia also. Officer Phillips
drove down the dirt road and observed the Dodge Ram drive out onto the roadway
"quickly." The Hyundia began to drive in the direction toward Officer Phillips car.
Officer Phillips motioned for the Hyundia to pull over which it did. The Dodge Ram
continued down the road.
To support his reasonable suspicion for pulling over defendant the officer, in his
report, Officer Phillips cites: 1) previous experience with Phillip Wietz, former owner of
the Dodge Ram; specifically, the fact that Officer Phillips had, in a previous search of the
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Dodge, found a gun and drugs; 2) the facts relayed to him from the call to dispatch; 3) the
ten minutes the car was reported to have been at the location.

This falls short of

reasonable suspicion that defendant committed a crime required to stop a vehicle.
A court, in determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, based upon a
tip, as in the case before the court, will look at whether the tip bear adequate indicia of
reliability. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. A citizen tip is often
considered adequate to generate reasonable suspicion if the content of the tip and the
basis of knowledge for the tip are adequate to substantiate reasonable suspicion. Id. at
813 and 1212. The court will look at whether a citizen informant is readily identifiable.
Id. In other words, was the tip anonymous or can their identity be easily verified? Id.
The court will also consider how detailed the information is in determining the adequacy
of the basis of knowledge of the tipster. Id. at 814 and 1213. For example, a tipster that
was a carnival worker was determined to be adequate to readily identify the provider. Id.
at 813 and 1212.
The call into dispatch in the case before the court is likely a citizen tip. However,
the tipster apparently did not provide his name. This is significant because it reduces the
likelihood that his identity can be readily ascertained. Further, there is no indication that
he provided any other information which would allow his identity to be ascertained. If,
for example, the caller had stated that he was the property owner of the land on which the
events that prompted the call occurred, it could be argued that the caller's identity is
readily ascertainable.
Significantly, the tipster also did not indicate how long before his call the events
he said observed took place. Further, the caller described the car as a "green" Hyundai,
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not a black Hyundia. The significance of this is that, even in the dark, a green car is more
likely to look black not the other way around. While the license plate number of the
Hyundia matched, the inaccuracy is relevant in considering the indicia of reliability of the
caller's information. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211.
Officer Phillips did not independently observe any behavior of criminal activity.
When Officer Phillips arrived on the scene he determined that the two cars appeared to be
those described by the caller and the cars, almost immediately, began to leave the area.

In particular, the Hyundai moved, without indication of a traffic violation, toward the
officer. If anything, the behavior of the Hyundai was consistent with lawful behavior.
While the information regarding the license plate numbers was readily verifiable, (See

Id.) by police; information regarding any criminal behavior was not. Officer Phillips
must have reasonable suspicion of any car he stops. He cannot use the fact that the
Dodge Ram left the area "quickly" to justify stopping the Hyundai.
Besides the fact that there was no indication the Dodge Ram violated any traffic
laws, actions by the Dodge Ram should not be considered in stopping the Hyundia,
particularly when, as in this case, the Hyundia was not connected to the activity observed
by the officer. Officer Phillips, before stopping the Hyundia, must consider specifically
what reasonable suspicion he has of criminal activity with respect to that automobile, not
another automobile in the close area.

In other words, Officer Phillips cannot use

"suspicious behavior" of one vehicle to justify stopping another vehicle. The court must
look only at the officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct by the Hyundai, yet he
cites the "quick" entry onto the main roadway to support his conclusion that drug activity
between the two cars.
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Returning to the three points Officer Phillips articulated to support reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity; first was his previous experience in dealing with the listed
owner of the Dodge Ram, Philip Wietz specifically; previously discovering weapons and
drugs in the Dodge Ram while driven by Mr. Wietz. This fact has little or no relevance
to the potential for criminal activity on the part of a subsequent driver of another vehicle.
There was no evidence that Officer Phillips confirmed the driver of the Ram. Reasonable
suspicion that once exists does not follow a vehicle through subsequent chain of
possession. This factor should have no bearing on reasonable suspicion. Had the officer
confirmed that Mr. Wietz was driving the car and/or had he been given reason to believe
the truck was stolen, Officer Phillips may have had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.
Second, Officer Phillips relied upon the comments of the caller into dispatch. In
addition to the fact that the tip did not meet the standard of citizen-informant because the
identity of the tipster is not readily identifiable. The reliability of the basis of the
information provided by the caller was also not reliable. The call was of suspicious
circumstances, not criminal behavior observed by the caller. The caller did not claim to
see any criminal conduct take place. The call was of "suspicious circumstances." As a
result, the officer should have observed and confirmed the information to establish
reasonable suspicion.

The caller did not even speculate as to any criminal activity

resulting from his observations. In fact, the caller said he did not know what was going
on. The basis of the caller's information was inadequate to provide reasonable suspicion
for the officer absent substantiation by the officer.
The third factor Officer Phillips cited to support reasonable suspicion was the ten
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minute period of time that the caller apparently observed during which defendant was in
the Dodge Ram. This is simply restating a portion of the second factor; the information
provided by the caller. It is not an independent basis of reasonable suspicion.
For these reasons, Officer Phillips lacked probable cause to initially stop the
Hyundai and the initial stop violated defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures.

3. A proper stop will be a violation of the Fourth Amendment if the scope of the
detention does not tie closely to the purpose of the original stop.
The court performs a "dual inquiry;" once the court determines that a stop was
proper at its inception the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified it in the beginning. See State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 614, 329
P.3d 391, 396 (Ct App. 2014) (citing State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931
(Ct App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct App.
2000)). An Investigative detention is acceptable if the police have "specific articulable
suspicion" that the detained person has or is about to commit a crime. Id.
Whether or not the police have a specific articulable suspicion is based upon the
totality of the circumstances. See State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220,
1223 (Ct App. 2003) (citing State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522
(1992).

A detaining officer must show "a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (quoting United States

v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981 ); State v. Salato,
137 Idaho 260, 264, 47 P.3d 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2001)). Suspicion may, however shift
from one offense to another. Id. At 984 and 1224 (citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho
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357, 362, 17 P.3d. 301, 306 (Ct App. 2000); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798
P.2d. 453,458 (Ct App. 1990)). Even a short detention must be tied to the purpose of the
original stop. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652, 51 P.3d. 461, 466 (Ct. App. 2007)
(criticized on other grounds). Even a warrants check requires reasonable suspicion to
detain and support the inquiry. See State v.Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 652 and 466. While a
reasonable suspicion standard is less than probable cause to arrest; both the quantity and
content will be considered in the determination. See State v. Sheldon 139 Idaho at 984
and 1224. In other words, if the tip has a low level ofreliability then other evidence must
be greater. See id.

4.

Even assuming the stop had been proper, the continued detention of
defendant was without reasonable suspicion because it exceeded the scope of
the purpose of the original stop.

Officer Phillips is clear in his report that he stopped the Hyundai based upon a
suspicion of a drug transaction. He approached the Hyundai and asked for identification
and asked where the defendant was coming from.

Defendant indicated that he was

staying at a friend's house. Curiously, Officer Phillips did not provide the address given
by defendant in his report for consideration. He said only that the address "sounded like"
one off Carnegie Street and Barkley Way. Although he apparently does not make an
effort to clarify, he opines that the explanation is inadequate because Laster runs
"parallel" to Laster Lane. He makes no other effort to clarify his reasoning nor does he
follow up with this line of questioning to determine if defendant could clarify his
concern. If Officer Phillips further questioned defendant it should have been directed at
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confirming or dispelling this concern.

Instead, Officer Phillips went on to ask defendant ifhe knew the person in the red
Dodge Ram. Defendant told him he did not. Then, a second time defendant denies
association with the red truck. At this point nothing Officer Phillips has seen refuted this
claim by defendant. Further, defendant explained the reason he is parked on Laster,
because he will not have to tum comers when leaving. Officer Phillips made no further
inquiry, therefore, it is unclear if defendant's explanation was reasonable. For example,
if defendant was trying to avoid left hand turns into traffic and, thereby, to avoid
unnecessary traffic delay.

Officer Phillips left the explanation at that, and did not

explain, in his report, any reason why the provided explanation did not make sense, if that
is the case. Instead, he lengthened the detention by running a warrant check.
At that point Officer Phillips had gained no more information to bolster his initial
hunch of drug activity than he had upon pulling over the vehicle; nor had he gained any
reasonable suspicion that any other offense occurred to shift a continued stop into another
area of investigation. The continued detention to run a warrant check is not based upon
reasonable suspicion and is a violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. It is
only after these violations of defendant's rights that he found an existing warrant as an
exploitation of the prior illegal stop and detention.

5. There existed no intervening circumstances which would have purged the
illegality of the detention
The state may attempt to argue that, despite the illegality of the detention,
evidence gleaned from the incident should be admissible as evidence because intervening
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circumstances purged the illegality. In State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, l 03 P.3d 454
(2004), a police officer noticed Mr. Page walking down the middle of a roadway carrying
some bags. See id. at 455 and 842. The roadway was clear of cars and the area had no
sidewalks, however, the officer stopped behind Page and approached him to talk to him.
See id. at 456 and 843. The officer exercised a "community caretaker'' function as the

basis for the stop. Id. In fact, the officer's questions, upon approaching Page, were
directed at his well-being.

See id.

This was what is characterized as a level one

encounter. Page was on foot not in a car.
The officer asked Page for some identification and was given a driver's license.
See id. The officer went back to his vehicle after telling Page that he was going to

"check" his name with the station to "let them know who he had stopped." Id. The
officer was then told that an outstanding warrant existed. See id.

In the course of

arresting Page on the warrant illegal drugs were found on Page's person. See id.
The defendant, on appeal, did not argue that the initial stop was unlawful; only
that the detention was. Defendant conceded that the "community caretaker" function was
proper to stop Page, who was on foot. Id. The trial court grated the motion to suppress
the evidence based on the detention. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, disagreed for a
very specific reason. The Court determined that an "intervening circumstance" had
occurred between the stop and the running of the warrant check which purged any
illegality with respect to the detention.

The Court looked at all the circumstances

surrounding the stop and actually agreed that no compelling reason existed to seize
Page's driver's license and conduct a warrant check. See id. at 458 and 845. The Court
indicated that once the community caretaker function was accomplished the officer must
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have additional reason to further detain Page. See id. Therefore, this case does not allow
police in any circumstances to allow for a warrants check. In fact, the Court specifically
reiterated that random stops to check for warrants is a Fourth Amendment violation. See
id.
The Court, however, points out that in this instance the discovery of the warrant
was "attenuated" from the illegal detention. See id. The Court goes on to list three
factors to determine whether "the causal chain has been sufficiently attenuated to
dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct. .. ". Id. The factors are: 1) the elapsed time
between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, 2) the occurrence of the
intervening circumstances, and 3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action. Id.
The case before this court, however, has significant differences from the Page
case. First, the case before this court involves a level two encounter and the stopping of
the individual in a car. While an officer can approach anyone on the street (a level one
encounter) and engage in conversation, as long as the participant willingly remains, the
officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop a vehicle; a level two
encounter. In the case before the court the initial stop was unlawful in addition to the
detention. As a result, the evidence in this matter was obtained from exploitation of two
instances of prior police misconduct. Both the increase in time between the misconduct
and the discovery of the evidence and the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action are, therefore, substantially increased.
At the point when Officer Phillips ran a warrant check on defendant he had not
asked him any questions regarding drug activity at all. It is only once Officer Phillips ran
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defendant's information and discovers an outstanding warrant that questioning turns
toward drug activity. All previous questioning related to simply where defendant was
coming from and where he was staying and whether defendant knew the driver of the
Dodge Ram. Defendant was not free to leave the level two stop as was Mr. Page in State
v. Page. This fact changed significantly the analysis of the Court. Reliance on Page to

claim that all stops allow for a warrant check and are ultimately justified as long as a
warrant is discovered is misplaced. Further, it is clear that result was not intended by the
Court.
Courts have made clear the limitations of the Page case. In Padilla v. State, 158
Idaho 184, 345 P.3d 243 (Ct App. 2014), the defendant was walking on a street when an
officer noticed him. He did not appear intoxicated but did appear lost. Mr. Padilla ran
after looking back at the officer and did not stop when the officer yelled for him to.
Evidence seized on Padilla at the jail was suppressed.
State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 155 P.3d 704 (Ct App. 2006), had a factual

pattern very similar to the case before this court. Cardenas was in a parked car. The
officer approached and asked Cardenas if he knew "Sarah." Id. at 706. Cardenas replied
that he did not. See id. The officer then asked who owned the Sentra which Cardenas
was driving. Cardenas told the officer that a friend owned it but he did not know the
friend's name. See id. The officer requested to search the vehicle for ownership papers,
which he did. See id. Eventually evidence of a crime was discovered. The Court found
that Cardenas was seized when the officer told him he wanted to talk him. See id. This
was despite the fact that the car had been parked. Because the detention resulted from an
unlawful seizure there was a Fourth Amendment violation. See id. Certainly Officer

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - 14

42

•

•

Phillips flagging over of the driving vehicle in the case before the court was a seizure. In
Cardenas the court stated the burden is on the state to prove that the evidence obtained

was, therefore, not tainted by the unlawful police conduct. See id. at 909 and 710. The
court affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
The stop of the Hyundai driven by defendant was not justified; neither in its
inception nor in the detention. Evidence gained in the unlawful stop; drugs found in
defendant's pocket in the search incident to the arrest, and detention must be suppressed
because no attenuating circumstances exist which would allow it into court against
defendant. Therefore defendant requests that the evidence be suppressed based upon the
violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure.
In this case, the police officers lacked a valid warrant to stop the vehicle, lacked
probable cause to stop the vehicle, lacked any reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as
a mere hunch is not good enough, this was not a consensual encounter, thus the evidence
obtained by this unlawful stop, search, seizure and arrest must be suppressed.

CZ._ day of ___.5
_____:t--r-e~\__,2016

Dated this
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

((?

,Se,~::t:

I hereby certify that on the
day of
copy of the within and foregoing document upon
noted:

,
2016, I served a true and correct
e individual(s)

named below in the manner

X By depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail.

D By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class.
D By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below.
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: (208) _ _ __
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office

Ryan
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SEP 2 0 2016
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S MEHIEL, DEPlJTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.
_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-2016-12011-C

ORDER RESETTING HEARING

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress
previously scheduled for October 12, 2016, shall be VACATED and RESCHEDULED for
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2016 at 11:00 A.M. before District Judge George A. Southworth at

the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho.
l)/)

Dated: September ..ailL-, 2016.

George A. Southworth
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2fJ day of September, 2016, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RESETTING HEARING by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following persons:
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
111 N. 1 I th Ave., Ste. 120
Caldwell, ID 83605

D U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
D Overnight Mail
DE-Mail

R
CJ

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
0 Overnight Mail
DE-Mail

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

~U·Q
Deputy Clerk
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de
BRYANF. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

SEP 27 2016
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S ALSUP, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2016-1201 l
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO

SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.

TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney, DALLIN
CRESWELL and does hereby object to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress based on the
argument(s) presented below.
Statement of Facts

Whereas the motion to suppress hearing has not yet been held, the State reserves
presentation of facts for said hearing. Argument(s) below may include at least some anticipated
fact(s).
Argument
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Assuming for the sake of argument, that reasonable, articulable suspicion does not
support the stop/detention of Defendant in this case, Idaho case law supports a finding in this
case that any taint from such unlawful conduct is dissipated through application of the
attenuation doctrine.
Generally, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search may not
be used against the victim of the search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471,485, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963). To determine whether to suppress
evidence as "fruit of the poisonous tree," the court must inquire whether the
evidence has been recovered as a result of the exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
Green, 111 F.3d at 520. The attenuation doctrine - whether the causal chain has
been sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct - has
been used to support the admission of evidence, including for example, voluntary
confessions obtained after unlawful arrests. Id. at 522 (citing Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975)). There are three factors for
a court to consider when determining whether unlawful conduct has been
adequately attenuated. Id. at 521 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04). The factors
are: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the
evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy
and purpose of the improper law enforcement action. Id.
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454,459 (2004).
The State begins this analysis by considering the elapsed time between the misconduct
and the acquisition of the evidence. Officer Phillips found two baggies of suspect substance.
About four to five minutes elapse from the time Officer Phillips stops Defendant to the discovery
of the first baggie. About seven minutes have elapsed since the stop when Officer Phillips
discovers the second baggie. In making the attenuation doctrine analysis in Page, the court
found "the attenuation analysis in [United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997)] to be
persuasive." Id. In Green, "only about five minutes elapsed between the illegal stop of the
Greens and the search of the car." Green, 111 F.3d at 521. Green found that "this weighs
against finding the search attenuated." Id. But, the very next sentence, Green added,
'"However, the time span between the police misconduct and the [search] is not "dispositive on
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
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the question of taint"' United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, -958 (7th Cir. 1990)." Id. Green
then found that the intervening circumstances of discovering a warrant dissipated any taint
caused by the illegal stop because in that case those intervening circumstances were not
outweighed by flagrant official misconduct.
Clearly the discovery of a warrant against Defendant is an intervening circumstance.
Green states, "Where a lawful arrest pursuant to a warrant constitutes the 'intervening
circumstance' (as in this case), it is an even more compelling case for the conclusion that the
taint of the original illegality is dissipated." Id. at 522.
The final factor to weigh is the flagrancy and purpose of unlawful official conduct. Law
enforcement was responding to a call of suspicious circumstances. Responding to calls of
suspicious circumstances is not an unusual or inappropriate function of their job, as they work to
serve and protect our communities. Officer Phillips witnessed facts consistent with the call
information when he responded. Officer Phillips stopped Defendant's vehicle because of its
apparent involvement in or connection to what the officer was informed of and/or observed, as
opposed to just being some random vehicle passing by the area. Even if the stop and detention in
this case are not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion of a violation of the law, that
does not equal flagrant action or improper purpose.
Assuming an illegal stop in Defendant's case, the discovery of the evidence was not the
result of exploitation of the illegality. Rather, the taint of the unlawful conduct was sufficiently
dissipated to allow admission of the evidence. Green states the following language, which was
essentially recognized by block quote in Page:
It would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally stopped an
automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to be wanted on a
warrant--in a sense requiring an official call of "Olly, Olly, Oxen Free." Because
the arrest is lawful, a search incident to the arrest is also lawful. The lawful arrest
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
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of A very constituted an intervening circumstance sufficient to dissipate any taint
caused by the illegal automobile stop.
Green, 111 F .3d at 521. In Page, the court ruled:
[], [O]nce the officer discovered that there was an outstanding warrant, an
intervening event under Green, he did not have to release Page and was justified
in arresting him at that point. Once he had effectuated a lawful arrest, he was
clearly justified in conducting a search incident to that arrest for the purpose of
officer or public safety or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969).
Therefore, it was not unlawful for the officer to seize the drugs discovered
incident to that arrest.
Page, 140 Idaho at 846-4 7.
The Page decision is simpler than Defendant's brief may indicate. Defendant tries to
create an issue by talking about "level one" and "level two" encounters. But, this Court will not
find any such terminology in the Page decision. It is irrelevant to the attenuation doctrine
application in this case that the detention in Page was preceded by a consensual encounter and
the stop in the present case was not. That attenuation doctrine analysis starts with an unlawful
stop or detention. In Page, the unlawful detention happened to have occurred during a
consensual encounter. In the present case, the State is assuming for the sake of argument that an
unlawful stop occurred when the officer stopped Defendant's vehicle. It is also irrelevant for the
attenuation doctrine analysis in this case that Defendant's case involves a stop by vehicle and
that the Page case involved a detention by foot. A stop is a stop. Regardless of whether law
enforcement stops or detains an individual, by foot or by vehicle, the Fourth Amendment
requirements are the same: reasonable, articulable suspicion. In fact, the Green decision, which
the Page decision finds persuasive, involved the unlawful stop of a vehicle.
Defendant's brief rather generally states, "Courts have made clear the limitations of the
Page case." Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence, 14. Yet, despite the plural
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indicator in the word "Courts", the only case then cited by Defendant on this subject is Padilla v.
State, 158 Idaho 184,345 P.3d 243 (Ct. App. 2014). In referring to Padilla, Defendant presents
an insufficient review of that case. Defendant fails to acknowledge that Padilla is distinguishable
from the present case inasmuch as the search leading to discovery of the evidence in Padilla
occurred before the discovery of the arrest warrant; a fact which precluded the arrest warrant
from being considered an intervening circumstances in that case. Nevertheless, the language in
the Padilla decision- a December 2014 decision- essentially stands as a testament that the
attenuation doctrine continues to be applicable to cases such as the present case.
Defendant also refers to State v. Cardenas. 143 Idaho 903. 155 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2006).
That case is inapposite to the application of the attenuation doctrine in this case.
Assuming an illegal stop in Defendant's case, the discovery of the evidence was not the
result of exploitation of the illegality. Rather, the taint of the unlawful conduct was sufficiently
dissipated to allow admission of the evidence.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that the Court deny Defendant's motion to
suppress in its entirety.

DATED this

u-fl~ay

of September, 2016.

DALLIN CRESWELL
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2--=-,_t___

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this _ _.....
day of September, 2016,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for
the Defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Canyon County Public Defender
111 N. 11 th Ave, Suite 120
Caldwell, ID 83605

() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
() Hand Delivered
(X) Placed in Court Basket
() Overnight Mail
() Facsimile
() E-Mail

DALLIN CRESWELL
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH DATE: October 3, 2016

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COURT MINUTE
CASE NO: CR2016-12011*C

TIME: 9:00 A.M.

REPORTED BY:
Patricia Terry
DCRT2 (910-912)

This having been the time heretofore set for pretrial conference in the above
entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Dallin Creswell, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney for Canyon County, and the defendant was personally present, represented by
counsel, Mr. Ryan Dowell.
The Court reviewed prior proceedings and inquired as to the status of this case.
Mr. Dowell advised the Court this matter was not settled and would request the
pretrial conference be continued for this Friday with the motion to suppress.
The Court noted the motion to suppress was set for October 7, 2016 at 11 :00
a.m. before Judge Southworth and jury trial for four days to commence on
November 1, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. before Judge Southworth.
COURT MINUTE
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The defendant was continued released on his own recognizance to Pretrial
Services.

COURT MINUTE
October 3, 2016
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH DATE: October 7, 2016

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COURT MINUTE
CASE NO: CR2016-12011*C
TIME: 11 :00 A.M.
REPORTED BY:
Patricia Terry
DCRT2 (11:03-12:01)(1:44-1:47)

This having been the time heretofore set for motion to suppress in the above
entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Dallin Creswell, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney for Canyon County, and the defendant was personally present in court, with
counsel, Mr. Ryan Dowell.
The Court reviewed prior proceedings held, noted this was the time set for
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress and instructed Mr. Dowell to proceed.
Mr. Dowell advised the Court he filed an Affidavit which as he understood, shifted
the burden to the State.
The Court indicated it would allow the State to proceed.
Mr. Creswell advised the Court the State had an evidentiary matter to address
prior to calling the officer. The State had certain evidence it would like to present to the
COURT MINUTES
October 7, 2016
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Court, that being an audio CD of the reporting citizen speaking with dispatch and the
Call Detail Report, and Mr. Creswell advised the Court as to the relevance of the
evidence.

Mr. Creswell requested the Court allow admission of that evidence for

purposes of this hearing.
Mr. Dowell advised the Court that he was in no way challenging credibility of the
call to dispatch, whether it was credible or not credible was not for him to determine and
he had no issue with the call details coming in, his objection was a matter of what basis
the officer was using to stop the vehicle and was there reasonable suspicion based on
what he knew at that time.
The Court indicated it would allow the Call Detail Report and the audio CD for
purposes of this hearing, but the Court was not making a decision at this point as to
what extent, if any, the Court would consider that in making its decision.
State's exhibit #1, identified as the Call Detail Report was marked, and State's
exhibit #2, identified as the audio CD of the call by the reporting citizen to dispatch was
marked and each were Ordered admitted for purposes of this hearing.
Mr. Creswell advised the Court for the record, he had communicated with the
defense prior to this date, and it was his understanding if the Court allowed the exhibits,
the defense would stipulate to their admission.
Mr. Dowell advised the Court the defense would not object as far as foundation.
State's exhibit #2 was published from the beginning up until 2 minutes and 22
seconds into the recording.

COURT MINUTES
October 7, 2016
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In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of counsel waived the requirement that the
Court Reporter report State's exhibit #2.
The State's first witness, ERIC PHILLIPS, was called and sworn by the clerk.
Mr. Dowell advised the Court that for purposes of this hearing, the defense stipulated to
law enforcement qualifications as a peace officer in the State of Idaho. The witness
was direct-examined. State's exhibit #3 was marked and identified as a CD of the video
recording of the officer's contact with the defendant. Mr. Creswell offered into evidence
exhibit #3 and requested the exhibit be published. Mr. Dowell examined the witness in
aid of objection, objected on the grounds of relevance, the objection was overruled and
exhibit #3 was Ordered admitted and was published. The witness was cross-examined.
Mr. Creswell advised the Court that the State had no further evidence.
Mr. Dowell advised the Court the defense did not have additional evidence.
Mr. Creswell presented argument in opposition to the motion to suppress.
Mr. Dowell responded with argument in support of the motion and requested the
Court suppress all evidence obtained.
The Court advised counsel it had one question to address, the officer received
information that there may have been a warrant, but he didn't receive verification that
the warrant was valid and still in effect until after he had already.searched the defendant
and inquired if that made any difference on the attenuation document.
Mr. Dowell indicated the Court already heard the testimony and could rely on that
as far as he was concerned.

COURT MINUTES
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The Court took this matter under advisement and indicated it would issue a
decision in due course.
The Court adjourned at 12:01 p.m.
Later this date . .. the Court reconvened at 1:44 p.m. Mr. Creswell was present

on behalf of the State, and the defendant was not personally present, but was
represented by Mr. Dowell.
Mr. Creswell noted that this Court had a question about some facts presented in
the motion to suppress, and requested this Court reopen the record to allow the officer
to come back this afternoon to present facts clarifying when he received confirmation of
the warrant. If the Court was not willing to do that, Mr. Creswell requested the State be
be allowed to submit additional briefing next Tuesday or Wednesday on what was
already presented earlier today.
The Court indicated it would allow the State until next Tuesday, October 11 th , to
submit an Affidavit from the officer regarding when he received confirmation of the
warrant, rather than reopening the testimony.
Mr. Creswell advised the Court his concern was that the State did not want to
deprive the defense an opportunity to cross examine the witness if an Affidavit was
submitted.
Mr. Dowell advised the Court if the officer was going to testify that he learned
about the warrant at a certain point, there was nothing he could cross-examine him on,
so if the State wanted to submit an Affidavit the defense was fine with that.

COURT MINUTES
October 7, 2016
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Upon request of Mr. Creswell, the Court indicated both sides could submit
additional briefing, in addition to further points and authorities by 5:00 p.m. on October
14th .

The defendant was continued released on his own recognizance to Pretrial
Services.

Depbty-Clerk

COURT MINUTES
October 7, 2016
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BRYANF. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2016-12011
Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENT TO
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, State ofldaho, by and through its attorney, DALLIN
CRESWELL and does hereby submit this supplement to the State's previously filed objection to
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

Attenuation Doctrine Analysis: Timing of Warrant Confirmation
At hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, the Court inquired as to the timing of
when Dispatch confirmed the existence of a warrant against Defendant. The Supreme Court of
Idaho in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 847, 103 P.3d 454,460 states:

It is important to note that had the drug evidence in this case been seized
after the officer seized Page's license and took it back to the patrol vehicle, but
SUPPLEMENT TO
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prior to discovery of the valid warrant, the considerations outlined in Green would
not justify the conclusion that the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from
improper police conduct so as to be admissible. See,~' S,tate v. Maland,
ISCR , 140 Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 430, 2004 Ida. LEXIS 192 (November 24,
2004). In such a case, evidence [*** 18] seized prior to the arrest, unless justified
by some other exception, would not be admissible simply because, ultimately, a
valid arrest warrant was discovered. A judicial determination of probable cause
focuses on the information and facts the officers possessed at the time. State v.
Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463,467,988 P.2d 689,693 (1999). It is only the fact that
there was an intervening factor between the unlawful seizure and discovery of the
evidence -- the discovery of the warrant in this case -- that creates the exception,
which permitted the officer to arrest Page and made the subsequent seizure of
evidence admissible.
In light of the possibility that analysis of the attenuation doctrine in this case may draw a
distinction between the time Dispatch first notified the officer of a warrant and the time that
warrant was confirmed, the State presents the facts and argument below.
Dispatch notified the officer of a warrant against Defendant. The officer received that
notification prior to finding the first baggie of white crystal substance. However, Dispatch then
had to confirm that the warrant was still valid and not just in their database. This requires
Dispatch to go to the warrants section in Dispatch, get out the actual paperwork, and look at the
warrant. When notified of a warrant, they (i.e. law enforcement) would detain at that point
pending confirmation, so that is when the officer had asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle
because as they were going to be continuing forward Defendant was going to be placed in
custody for the warrant and if it was confirmed the officer would take Defendant to the Canyon
County jail. Thus, while there is no evidence in the record establishing confirmation of the
warrant prior to the discovery of the first baggie of white crystal substance, the evidence does
support a finding that the officer was notified of a warrant against Defendant prior to finding that
first baggie.
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Furthermore, the evidence shows that the warrant was confirmed prior to the discovery of
a second baggie of white crystal substance. Based on the officer's affidavit filed on October 11,
2016 and the video admitted into evidence at the hearing, the officer conducted a subsequent
search of Defendant and while doing so advised Defendant he was under arrest for a warrant.
The officer explains in his affidavit that he "would not have made that statement as heard in the
video unless the warrant had been confirmed." Affidavit of Eric Phillips, 2. Subsequent to
telling Defendant he was under arrest for a warrant, the officer found a second baggie of white
crystal substance.
There are two pieces of potential evidence in this case: two baggies of white crystal
substance. The first baggie was found after the officer was notified of a warrant against
Defendant. The second baggie was found after the officer received confirmation of that warrant
from Dispatch. The State earlier argued that assuming law enforcement performed an illegal
traffic stop of Defendant, the discovery of the evidence is admissible pursuant to the attenuation
doctrine.
The State recognizes that the Court may find it more difficult to apply the attenuation
doctrine to the first baggie of substance inasmuch as the warrant had not yet been confirmed by
Dispatch and Defendant was apparently not yet under arrest for that warrant. However, the State
argues that even if the Court finds the attenuation doctrine insufficient to admit the first baggie of
substance, the attenuation doctrine would still allow admissibility of the second baggie of
substance, wherein it was found after the warrant was confirmed and after the officer told
Defendant he was under arrest for the warrant.
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Inevitable Discovery Analysis: If Stop is Lawful but Discovery of First Baggie is Unlawful
'
In the event the Court finds that there was a reasonable articulable suspicion for the
traffic stop but that the discovery of the first baggie of substance is still inadmissible based on an
unlawful search, then the State argues for admissibility of said baggie based on the inevitable
discovery doctrine.
State v. Bunting. 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006) states:
The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches
and bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to the illegal search.
.See Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,496, 36 P.3d 1278, 1284 (2001). An exception
to the exclusionary [* ** 18] rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. The
inevitable discovery doctrine applies when a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that the information would have inevitably been discovered by
lawful methods. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed.
2d 377 (1984); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,286 n.4, 108 P.3d 424,433 n.4
(Ct. App. 2005).
Further, State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787-88, 352 P.3d 506, 509-10 (Ct. App. 2015)
provides that:
This doctrine balances society's interests in deterring illegal police conduct and in
having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime by only applying the
exclusionary rule to put the government in the same, not a worse, position that it
would have occupied absent the police misconduct. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443; State v.
Russo, 157 Idaho 299,306,336 P.3d 232, 239 (2014); see also State v. Bower,
135 Idaho 554,558, 21 P.3d 491,495 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting that, because of the
high cost the exclusionary rule imposes upon society by allowing the guilty to
escape prosecution, it should be employed only when there has been a substantive
violation of a defendant's constitutional rights). When the discovery of the
evidence would have been inevitable as the result of other lawful means, the
exclusionary rule [***9] fails to serve this purpose, and, therefore, does not
apply. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44.
Although those lawful means need not be the result of a wholly
independent investigation, State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807,
813 (Ct. App. 2002), they must be the result of some action that actually took
place (or was in the process of taking place) that would inevitably have led to the
discovery of the unlawfully obtained evidence, Bunting. 142 Idaho at 915-16, 136
P.3d at 386-87. Indeed, the inevitable discovery doctrine was never intended to
swallow the exclusionary rule by substituting what the police should have done
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for what they really did or were doing. State v. Holman, [**510] [*788] 109
Idaho 382,392, 707 P.2d 493,503 (Ct. App. 1985); Cook, 106 Idaho at 226,677
P.2d at 539.
Other cases provided to the State on this subject - most of which are cited in the material above
-are: Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209,677 P.2d 522 (Ct.
App. 1984); State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 57 P.3d 807 (Ct. App. 2002) (e.g. "We therefore
hold that a wholly independent investigation, while certainly relevant to whether discovery was
inevitable, is not a prerequisite to application of the inevitable discovery exception."
Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 813); State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707 P.2d 493
(Ct. App. 1985); State v. Zapp. 108 Idaho 723, 701 P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985); Stuart v. State, 136
Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); State v.
Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 125 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2005).

If this Court finds that the traffic stop is supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion
but that the discovery of the first baggie of substance is not admissible, then the Court is
essentially concluding that the search which led to that discovery was an unlawful search. The
question then, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, is whether a preponderance of the
evidence shows that the first baggie would have inevitably been discovered by lawful methods.
"The crucial inquiry for a court evaluating an inevitable discovery claim is
whether proper and predictable police investigatory procedures [* **14] normally
followed by the police department in question would have uncovered the evidence
without the illegality." W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS
AND CONFESSIONS§ 3.3(b) at 3-17 (1983).

Finally, it should be recognized that normally HN7'f' the state must
establish two things before the inevitable discovery doctrine can be applied. The
state must show first that "certain proper [* **16] and predictable investigatory
procedures would have been utilized." Second, the state must demonstrate that
"those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence
in question." LaCount and Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery Rule, "An Evolving
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Exception To The Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB.L.REV. 483,491
(1976). Although the state in the present case offered no affirmative showing of
these two elements, the record amply supplies the required facts ....
State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 216-17, 677 P.2d 522, 529-30 (Ct. App. 1984). Because of the
discovery of the warrant in this case, there is little doubt Defendant would have been searched
and arrested after the warrant was confirmed. That search would have led to the discovery of the
first baggie of substance, as well as the second baggie of substance.

DATED this

r3~y

of October, 2016,

DALLIN CRESWELL
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3¾

day of October, 2016, I
J
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for the
Defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
() Hand Delivered
(X) Placed in Court Basket
() Overnight Mail
() Facsimile
() E-Mail

Canyon County Public Defender
111 N. 11 th Ave, Suite 120
Caldwell, ID 83605

D~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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RYAN K. DOWELL, Deputy Public Defender
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave., Suite 120
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: 208-649-1818
Facsimile: 208-649-1819
Idaho State Bar # 7796
rdowell@canyonco.org

F I A.~z&d

qM.

OCT 13 2016
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
B DOMINGUEZ, DEPUTY

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR-2016-12011-C

Plaintiff,
vs.
TAYLOR FAIRCHILD,

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through the Canyon County Public
Defender, Ryan K. Dowell, and submits a MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
LEGAL BASIS FOR SUPRESSION
PROBABLE CAUSE GENERAL

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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There are three (3) types of contacts between law enforcement and private
individuals, including (1) consensual encounters which is not a seizure and no
justification is required; (2)

stop/investigative detention justified by reasonable

suspicion; and (3) actual arrests justified by probable cause. State v. Holcomb, 128
Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct.App. 1995); State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d
1237 (Ct.App. 1992); and State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 815 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991).
Whenever an officer stops an individual and restrains their freedom, even
momentarily, that person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore, the stop and detention must comply with the constitutional standards of
reasonableness. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); Matter of Clayton, 113
Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); and State v. Waldie, 126 864, 893 P.2d 811
(Ct.App. 1995). The stop and detention of a suspect is justifiable under the Fourth
Amendment only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, that the suspect has been, is, or is about to engage in criminal activity.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975); State v. Benefiel,

131 Idaho 226,953 P.2d 976 (1998); and State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237, 939 P.2d 556
(1997). The stop must be based on more than mere speculation, inarticulated hunches or
instinct. See Terry; State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 953 P.2d 645 (Ct.App. 1998); and
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522,' 525 (Ct.App. 1991).

Ordinary and routine traffic stops are a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and therefore, the stop must be based on reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the vehicle is being driven in violation of the traffic laws or that the vehicle or an
occupant has been or is about to engage in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449
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U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979);
and State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (1999). Moreover, a reasonable
suspicion requires more than a "'mere hunch' or 'inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion."' State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203, 1211 (2009); (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415, 110 L.ed.2d 301, 308
(1990)). Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on the particular facts surrounding
the stop.
It is well established law that an individual has a reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy where there is a subjective expectation of privacy in the area
searched or seized and society is willing to accept the subjective expectation of privacy.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979); Katz v. United States, 289 U.S.
347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); and State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 893 P.2d 806 (Ct.App.
1995). Generally the driver of a vehicle has standing to contest the reasonableness of an
investigatory stop as well as the continued detention. State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405,
679 P.2d 1123 (1984).
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, thus if it is established that the warrantless search or
seizure infringed on ari individual's legitimate privacy interest, the state must show that
the search or seizure fell within the delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); and State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 900
P.2d 196 (1995). Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous
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tree." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); and State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). In
summary, the evidence acquired as a result of a constitutionally impermissible search or
seizure will be excluded unless the causal connection between the seizure and the
acquisition has been broken. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407
(1963); and State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 787 P .2d 231 (1990).
REASONABLE SUSPICION

A court, in determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, based upon a
tip, as in the case before the court, will look at whether the tip bear adequate indicia of
reliability. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. A citizen tip is often
considered adequate to generate reasonable suspicion if the content of the tip and the
basis of knowledge for the tip are adequate to substantiate reasonable suspicion. Id. at
813 and 1212. The court will look at whether a citizen informant is readily identifiable.
Id. In other words, was the tip anonymous or can their identity be easily verified? Id.

The court will also consider how detailed the information is in determining the adequacy
of the basis of knowledge of the tipster. Id. at 814 and 1213. For example, a tipster that
was a carnival worker was determined to be adequate to readily identify the provider. Id.
at 813 and 1212.
FACTS, NOT THE CHARGE, GIVE Rl:SE TO AN ARREST

Hernandez v. State, 132 Idaho 352, 972 P.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1998) address the
issue of facts, not the charge, give rise to an arrest.

In Hernandez the officer was

conducting routine patrol in Caldwell, Idaho at 12:42 a.m. and observed Mr. Hernandez,
outside of a bar looking around suspiciously and appeared to be a hand to hand delivery
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of something. The officer had prior drug related dealings with one of the individuals and
followed that vehicle to a residence. Mr. Hernandez exited the vehicle after reaching and
collecting something from one of the other passengers. As Mr. Hernandez "hurried into
the residence" the officer told Hernandez to stop and Hernandez looked at the officer then
"hurried into the residence." Later the officer observed packages of white substance in
the kitchen where Mr. Hernandez went after entering the house.
The court came to a conclusion that "this entire incident was treated as a Terry
stop by the officer, and Hernandez dutifully complied and fully cooperated once he was
summoned from the house. The state's argument is postured to provide hindsight
justification for Hernandez's concededly illegal arrest for public urination." We will not
permit the state to bootstrap an illegal arrest onto a retrospectively rationalized arrestable
offense. State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780 n. 1,963 P.2d 1215, 1217 n. 1 (Ct. App.
1998)(noting that officers cannot "lift themselves by their bootstraps" by demanding to
search a vehicle and, if the occupant says "no," using that resistance as an excuse to arrest
the occupant). The objective actions of Officer Damron in detaining Hernandez through
the execution of the search warrant were at all times consistent with a Terry stop, and at
no time was Hernandez placed in "police custody" consistent with an arrest. Compare
State v. Cootz, 110 Idaho 807, 810, 718 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Ct. App. 1986)-49. It was only
after the search warrant was fully executed and proved fruitless that Hernandez was
arrested.
ACTIVATION OF PATROL CAR LIGHTS

In State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999) the Idaho Court
of Appeal determined that the activation of a patrol car's overhead lights is a stop and
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detention. A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of
all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was no longer
free to leave. Waldie, 126 Idaho, 866. Once Hulse activated the police car's emergency
lights, Mireles, assuming he was cognizant of the fact, was not free to drive away. See
I.C. § 49-1404 (prohibiting fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer when signaled
to stop by the officer's emergency lights and/or siren). Thus, the district court erroneously
concluded that Mireles had not been detained. Because Mireles was technically detained,
it was incumbent upon the state to prove a proper justification for the detention. State v.
Sery, 129 Idaho 613,615,930 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Ct. App. 1997).
UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR IN HIGH CRIME AREA

In State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 831 P.2d 942 (Ct. App. 1991) the Idaho Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of unusual behavior in a high crime area.

The court

ultimately concluded (1) defendant who was sitting in pickup in parking lot was "seized"
within meaning of Fourth Amendment; (2) officers did not have objective basis for
making investigative stop; and (3) officers were not exercising community caretaking
function by approaching pickup and questioning driver. Id.
SCOPE

The court performs a "dual inquiry;" once the court determines that a stop was
proper at its inception the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances •
which justified it in the beginning. See State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 614, 329
P.3d 391,396 (Ct App. 2014) (citing State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,931
(Ct App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct App.
2000)). An Investigative detention is acceptable if the police have "specific articulable
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suspicion" that the detained person has or is about to commit a crime. Id.
Whether or not the police have a specific articulable suspicion is based upon the
totality of the circumstances. See State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220,
1223 (Ct App. 2003) (citing State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522
A detaining officer must show "a particularized and objective basis for

(1992).

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (quoting United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); State v. Salato,
137 Idaho 260, 264, 47 P.3d 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2001)). Suspicion may, however shift
from one offense to another. Id. At 984 and 1224 (citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho
357, 362, 17 P.3d. 301, 306 (Ct App. 2000); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798
P.2d. 453,458 (Ct App. 1990)). Even a short detention must be tied to the purpose of the
original stop. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652, 51 P.3d. 461, 466 (Ct. App. 2007)
(criticized on other grounds). Even a warrants check requires reasonable suspicion to
detain and support the inquiry. See State v.Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 652 and 466. While a
reasonable suspicion standard is less than probable cause to arrest; both the quantity and
content will be considered in the determination.

See State v. Sheldon 139 Idaho at 984

and 1224.
PAGE & PADILLA

In State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004), a police officer noticed Mr.
Page walking down the middle of a roadway carrying some bags. See id. at 455 and 842.
The roadway was clear of cars and the area had no sidewalks, however, the officer
stopped behind Page and approached him to talk to him. See id. at 456 and 843.

The

officer exercised a "community caretaker" function as the basis for the stop. Id. In fact,
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the officer's questions, upon approaching Page, were directed at his well-being. See id.
Page was on foot not in a car.
The officer asked Page for some identification and was given a driver's license.
See id. The officer went back to his vehicle after telling Page that he was going to

"check" his name with the station to "let them know who he had stopped." Id. The
officer was then told that an outstanding warrant existed. See id. In the course of
arresting Page on the warrant illegal drugs were found on Page's person. See id.
The defendant, on appeal, did not argue that the initial stop was unlawful; only
that the detention was. Defendant conceded that the "community caretaker" function was
proper to stop Page, who was on foot. Id. The trial court grated the motion to suppress
the evidence based on the detention. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, disagreed for a
very specific reason.

The Court determined that an "intervening circumstance" had

occurred between the stop and the running of the warrant check which purged any
illegality with respect to the detention.

The Court looked at all the circumstances

surrounding the stop and actually agreed that no compelling reason existed to seize
Page's driver's license and conduct a warrant check See id. at 458 and 845. The Court
indicated that once the community caretaker function was accomplished the officer must
have additional reason to further detain Page. See id. Therefore, this case does not allow
police in any circumstances to allow for a warrants check. In fact, the Court specifically
reiterated that random stops to check for warrants is a Fourth Amendment violation. See
id.

The Court, however, points out that in this instance the discovery of the warrant
was "attenuated" from the illegal detention. See id. The Court goes on to list three
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factors to determine whether ''the causal chain has been sufficiently attenuated to
dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct. .. ". Id. The factors are: 1) the elapsed time
between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, 2) the occurrence of the
intervening circumstances, and 3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action. Id.
Addressing the 3 factors in Page, the case before this court, however, has
significant differences from the Page case. First, the case before this court involves an
encounter that is more significant than that in Page (i.e. the stopping of the individual in a
car vs. a consensual encounter on the street). Thus, the flagrancy and purpose behind the
improper law enforcement action is more significant.
Regarding the passage of time it can be referred to both the call log which this
court has as an exhibit along with the video of the stop which does not immediately start
when the stop begins. The call report does not indicate when Phillips arrived on scene
but we do know that he was the first officer on scene. We do see the call indicating the
red vehicle driving off at 8:55:22 but no indication if that was reported during, before or
after the stop. We can also see that Fairchild was detained at 09:02:45 which is more
than 7 minutes later. Time can somewhat be inferred from the video of the stop and from
testimony but several minutes had elapsed. Another issue with the lapse in time is that
the search of Fairchild can be seen on the video but at the same time Phillips had made no
indication of a warrant until after the search was completed, which both Page and Padilla
indicate as an illegal seizure.
At the point when Officer Phillips ran a warrant check on defendant he had not
asked him any questions regarding drug activity at all. It is only once Officer Phillips ran
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defendant's information and discovers an outstanding warrant that questioning turns
toward drug activity. All previous questioning related to simply where defendant was
coming from and where he was staying and whether defendant knew the driver of the
Dodge Ram. This fact changed significantly the analysis of the Court. Reliance on Page
to claim that all stops allow for a warrant check and are ultimately justified as long as a
warrant is discovered is misplaced. Further, it is clear that result was not intended by the
Court. This would encourage rouge policing whereby police can simply stop vehicles
randomly just too see if people have warrants.
Courts have made clear the limitations of the Page case. In Padilla v. State, 158
Idaho 184, 345 P.3d 243 (Ct App. 2014), the defendant was walking on a street when an
officer noticed him. He did not appear intoxicated but did appear lost. Mr. Padilla ran
after looking back at the officer and did not stop when the officer yelled for him to.
Evidence seized on Padilla at the jail was suppressed.
State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 155 P.3d 704 (Ct App. 2006), had a factual
pattern very similar to the case before this court. Cardenas was in a parked car. The
officer approached and asked Cardenas ifhe knew "Sarah." Id. at 706. Cardenas replied
that he did not. See id. The officer then asked who owned the Sentra which Cardenas
was driving. Cardenas told the officer that a friend owned it but he did not know the
friend's name. See id. The officer requested to search the vehicle for ownership papers,
which he did. See id. Eventually evidence of a crime was discovered. The Court found
that Cardenas was seized when the officer told him he wanted to talk him. See id. This
was despite the fact that the car had been parked. Because the detention resulted from an
unlawful seizure there was a Fourth Amendment violation. See id. Certainly Officer
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Phillips flagging over of the driving vehicle in the case before the court was a seizure. In
Cardenas the court stated the burden is on the state to prove that the evidence obtained

was, therefore, not tainted by the unlawful police conduct. See id. at 909 and 710. The
court affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
In this case, the police officers lacked a valid warrant to stop the vehicle, lacked
probable cause to stop the vehicle, lacked any reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as
a mere hunch is not good enough (which is exactly what this case entails), this was not a
consensual encounter, thus the evidence obtained by this unlawful stop, search, seizure
and arrest must be suppressed.

Dated this I 'S day of

{) c:....-+

, 2016
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2016, I served a true and correct
Qc_~
day of
I hereby certify that on the
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner
noted:

I::>

X By depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail.

D By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class.
D By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) indicated below.
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: (208) _ _ __
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office

Ryan
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OCT 2 6 2016
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
8 DOMINGUEZ, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CR-2016-12011
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Defendant Taylor James Fairchild has filed a motion to suppress. For the following
reasons, the Court has granted his motion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant

has

been

charged

with

possession

of

a

controlled

substance

(methamphetamine), a felony under Idaho Code section 37-2732(c)(l). On August 5, 2016, he
entered a plea of not guilty. He filed a motion to suppress on September 2, 2016. The State filed
an objection to Defendant's motion on September 27, 2016. A hearing was held on Defendant's
motion on October 7, at which time the Court took this matter under advisement. On October 11,
2016, the State filed an affidavit prepared by Officer Eric Phillips in support of the State's
objection to Defendant's motion. On October 13, 2016, the State also filed a supplement to its
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objection to Defendant's motion. The same day, Defendant filed a memorandum of law in
support of its motion to suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are derived from the briefing, affidavits, and evidence submitted by
the parties. At about 8:30 am on July 8, 2016, Caldwell resident Layne Stark contacted the
sheriff's office to report two men sitting in a truck parked near his house. When dispatch
answered his call, Stark said, "I was wondering if I could have somebody sent out. I'm a little
concerned about a transaction or something going down behind my house." The dispatcher asked
him what was taking place, and he replied, ''two cars just come up really fast and pull around and
meet up and they get out and they're just both just sitting in the truck together . . . It could be
nothing but too often things happen back there and the way they pulled up so fast it looks like
[unintelligible]." Stark provided dispatch with the make, description, and license plate numbers
of both vehicles. One was a red Dodge Ram pickup. The other was a dark-colored Hyundai.
Stark stated that two individuals had been sitting in the truck for about ten minutes. In addition to
providing the description and license plate numbers of the vehicles, Stark provided his home
address and identified Laster Lane and Lathrop Avenue as nearby streets. Officer Eric Phillips
was dispatched to the area. While en route, he ran the plate numbers provided by Stark and
discovered that the Dodge pickup was registered to Philip Daniel Wietz, whom Officer Phillips
knew from previous experience to be a drug user.
When Officer Phillips arrived, he noticed both vehicles driving away from the scene. The
Dodge drove away from Officer Phillips in the direction of Indiana Avenue. The Hyundaidriven by Defendant-headed down Laster Lane toward Officer Phillips. As the car approached
him, Officer Phillips flicked his overhead lights and stuck his hand out the patrol car window to
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motion the Defendant to stop. The Defendant complied.
Officer Phillips' body camera video footage shows that Defendant stopped his car on a
portion of Later Lane that runs between what appears to be a well-kept subdivision full ofnewerlooking homes on one side, and a field of farmland on the other. The footage also shows that it
was daytime and sunny outside during the encounter.
After stopping Defendant, Officer Phillips walked toward Defendant's car and requested
that Defendant provide his identification. Defendant handed Officer Phillips his driver's license,
and Officer Phillips radioed Defendant's information into dispatch. He then began questioning
Defendant about where Defendant was coming from, and whether he had been interacting with
the driver of the red pickup truck. Defendant told Officer Phillips that he was in the area because
he had spent the night at a friend's house, and denied having contact with the driver of the
pickup truck.
Officer Phillips told Defendant that "[y]ou guys got called in for being parked back here.
People were just concerned because normally people don't park back here. There was two
vehicles parked next to each other." Officer Phillips continued to question Defendant about what
he had been doing in the area, and Defendant continued to deny being involved with the driver of
the red truck.
Officer Phillips instructed Defendant to tum off his vehicle and asked Defendant if he
was on probation. Defendant replied that he was on probation "out of Pocatello Idaho" for a
paraphernalia charge. Officer Phillips told Defendant to step out of the car and asked Defendant
to allow him to search him. Defendant obeyed. Officer Phillips patted him down, but also
reached into Defendant's pants pockets. It does not appear from Officer Phillips' video that there
was any indication that Defendant was armed or dangerous. After reaching into one of
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Defendant's pockets, Officer Phillips found and removed a small baggie of a white powdered
substance. Officers immediately arrested Defendant, placed him in handcuffs, and read his
Miranda rights.
Officer Phillips asked another officer at the scene to watch the Defendant so he could get
gloves from his patrol car. Officer Phillips then walked to his patrol car, opened the trunk, and
used his radio to report that he had found methamphetamine on the Defendant. Officer Phillips
retrieved disposable gloves from the trunk. Officer Phillips walked back to Defendant and asked,
''what else do you have in here?" Defendant replied, but his reply is unintelligible on the body
camera footage. Officer Phillips then stated, "Ok so you do have a warrant ... out of Pocatello .
. . so you are under arrest for that." On the body camera footage, the audio did not pick up the
precise moment when Officer Phillips received confirmation of Defendant's warrant. However,
Officer Phillips' affidavit makes clear that the warrant was not confirmed until after the officers
conducted the initial search, found the methamphetamine, and arrested Defendant:
during the detention of Defendant, another officer watched Defendant while I
opened the trunk of my patrol vehicle ... subsequent to opening the trunk of my
patrol vehicle, I again contacted Defendant[. D]uring the second contact with
Defendant I informed him that he was under arrest for the warrant ... by the time
I informed defendant he was under arrest for the warrant, Canyon County
Sheriffs Office Dispatch had confirmed that there was a warrant, and I know that
is true because based on my common practice of handling warrant arrests I would
not have made that statement as heard in the video unless the warrant had been
confirmed . . . subsequent to informing Defendant he was under arrest for the
warrant, and thus subsequent to the Canyon County Sheriffs Officer Dispatch
confirming the existence of a warrant against Defendant, I discovered a second
baggie of white crystal substance.
A.ff. of Eric Phillips, Octf. 11 2016, pg. 2. The body camera video shows that Officer Phillips

opened his trunk, retrieved disposal gloves, and put them on. After returning from his trunk with
the gloves, Officer Phillips asked Defendant what else he had "in there" before telling him about
the warrant. This sequence of events indicates that the warrant was confirmed either after Officer
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Phillips had asked Defendant what else he had "in there," or while Officer Phillips was asking
the question.
After Officer Phillips told Defendant that the warrant had been confirmed, he finished
searching Defendant. A second baggie of white crystal substance was found in Defendant's pants
pocket. The substance in both baggies was positively identified as methamphetamine, and
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
ANALYSIS

Defendant has argued that the responding officers did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop the Defendant; that the scope of the stop exceeded the stop's initial purpose; and that there
were no intervening circumstances sufficient to purge the illegality of the stop. Thus, the
Defendant argues, the methamphetamine discovered in Defendant's car should be suppressed as
fruit of the poisonous tree. The State has argued that the citizen's phone call and Officer Phillips'
prior knowledge of the individual to whom the Dodge truck was registered was sufficient to
create reasonable suspicion. The State also argues that the second baggie ofmethamphetamine is
admissible under the attenuation exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
A. The Initial Stop of Defendant Was Not Justified By Reasonable Suspicion

It appears that the State is not disputing that the initial encounter with Defendant was a
stop. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart, Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right of every citizen to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 906, 155 P.3d 704, 707
(Ct. App. 2006); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16 (1968).
But not all encounters between police and citizens implicate the Fourth Amendment. Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. at 8-9, 88 S. Ct. at 1873. A seizure does not occur simply because a police
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officer approaches a person and asks him if he is willing to answer some questions.

See

Cardenas at 143 Idaho at 907, 155 P.3d at 708; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434,

111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 398 (1991). Only when an officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen is that citizen seized. State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). Whether or not a stop has occurred

depends upon whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the defendant would have felt free to
ignore the police presence and go about his business. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434,
111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). In this case, Officer Phillips flicked his overhead
lights and flagged down the Defendant. There is no question that Defendant was stopped.
Furthermore, there is little doubt that the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. Police officers may temporarily detain a person in order to investigate possible
criminal behavior, even when the officer does not have enough probable cause to make an arrest.
See State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102-104, 831 P.2d 942, 944-946 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. In order to pass constitutional muster, an investigatory

seizure, or "stop," must be justified by the officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
person seized has committed or was about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 621 ( 1981 ). Whether or not an officer has reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory seizure depends upon the totality of the circumstances-the information
known to the officer at the time of the stop must yield a particularized and objective basis for the
officer's suspicion. State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. App. 2004).
In determining whether or not a stop was justified, courts do not give weight to an officer's
hunch or unparticularized suspicion, but instead, to specific reasonable inferences that the officer
entitled to draw from the facts, based on his experience. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct.
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at 1883. The Supreme Court held in.Illinois v. Wardlow that officers had reasonable, articulable
suspicion to stop a suspect in a known narcotics trafficking area when the suspect ran upon
seeing the police. 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The Court reasoned that
the high-drug neighborhood, and the fact that the suspect actually ran from the police gave rise to
the police officer's reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot. Id But in Brown v. Texas, the
Supreme Court held that an individual's presence in a high-drug neighborhood at night, in the
absence of other factors, is not enough to give rise to reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot.
See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed. 357 (1979).

Reasonable suspicion can arise from an informant's tip or from a citizen's report of
suspicious activity. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990); see also Wilson
v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 136 Idaho 270, 32 P.3d 164 (Ct. App. 2001). Whether the information

provided by a citizen or an informant is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion that justifies a
stop depends upon the content and the reliability of the information presented by the source,
including whether the informant reveals his identity and the basis of his knowledge. Id. at 330,
110 S. Ct. at2416; 136 Idaho at 275, 32 P.3d at 169.
In this case, the State has emphasized that the tip the officers received was reliable,
because the caller provided his name, address, and numerous details about the circumstances he
described-including the precise location, a description of the vehicles, and correct license plate
numbers. This Court agrees that the information provided by the caller was plainly reliable.
However, both content and reliability are required for a citizen's tip to create reasonable
suspicion. In this case, the caller simply stated that two cars were parked alongside the road, and
that two people had been sitting in one of the cars for ten minutes. The caller even stated that it
could be ''nothing."
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In order to determine whether the officer's stop of Defendant was justified in this case,
this Court has looked, as it must, to the facts known by the officer at the time of the encounter.
The facts known to Officer Phillips at the time he detained the Defendant were that on a bright,
sunny morning, in a subdivision full of newer-looking homes, a concerned resident reported that
a car and a truck pulled up and parked on the street, and that two men sat in one of the vehicles
for about ten minutes. The caller speculated that the men could be engaging in an unspecified
''transaction," but also speculated that it could be ''nothing." The caller did not report seeing the
men doing drugs or otherwise breaking the law. The only other information that Officer Phillips
had upon arriving at the scene was that the Dodge pickup (not the vehicle driven by the
Defendant) had been registered to an individual (also not the Defendant) who had been involved
with drugs in the past.
No matter how reliable the source of the tip in this case, the content of the tip and the
facts available to Officer Phillips upon his arrival at the scene were simply not enough to create
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime.
In light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. Texas that a suspect's
presence in a high drug neighborhood at night was not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion,
this Court cannot justify finding reasonable suspicion based on Defendant's presence in a wellkept subdivision on a bright, sunny morning. While it is true that Defendant may have spent ten
minutes sitting in a truck that was registered to an individual who had used drugs in the past, it is
unclear whether that was even the same individual driving the truck that day. The caller did not
state that he saw either man consume drugs, or that he saw money change hands. There is no
indication that the area was a high-crime or high-drug neighborhood. At best, Defendant's
presence in the truck could give rise to a hunch or a generalized sense of suspicion. In the
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absence of any articulable facts indicating that crime was afoot, this Court has concluded that the
initial stop was unlawful
B. The First Baggie of Methamphetam.ine is Fruit of the Poisonous Tree and Therefore
Shall Be Suppressed
1. Because the initial stop was unlawful, the first baggie will be suppressed as fruit
of the poisonous tree

Having determined that the initial stop was unlawfu~ the Court must conclude that the
first baggie of methamphetamine is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. The fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine is well-settled-evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of illegal government action. See Wong

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 (1963); see also State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454,459 (2004). Because the initial stop was unlawful, and because the
discovery of the first baggie of methamphetamine was the product of that unlawful stop, this
Court must exclude the first baggie ofmethamphetamine as the fruit of the poisonous tree. 1
2. Even if the initial stop had been lawful, a Terry frisk was improper, and thus,
the fll"st baggie would be suppressed as fruit of the unlawful frisk

Even if the initial stop were legal, the subsequent pat-down of Defendant would still
preclude admission of the first baggie of methamphetamine. Where an officer has seized a
defendant for an investigatory search, that officer may conduct a limited pat-down search of the
outer layers of a person's clothing all over his body to find weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968). A "Terry'' frisk is only permissible when, at the moment of the
frisk, the officer has reason to believe that the individual he is investigating is armed and
dangerous, and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer's belief. Id. at 24,
In its supplemental briefing, the State urged the Court to find the first baggie of methamphetamine admissible
under the inevitable discovery doctrine, an argument that would have required this Court to find the initial stop to be
lawful. Because this Court found the initial stop to be unlawful, the Court will not address the State's argument on
inevitable discovery.
1
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88 S.Ct. at 1881. An officer's belief that a defendant is armed and dangerous must be objectively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and depends upon whether a reasonably
prudent person would be justified in concluding that an individual posed a risk of danger. State v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61, 152 P.3d 16, 21-22 (2007). A Terry frisk can be justified when

officers can see a bulge in a Defendant's pocket that resembles a weapon. See State v. Holler,
136 Idaho 287, 292, 32 P.3d 679, 684 (Ct. App. 2001). Courts may also take into account a
Defendant's refusal to remove his hands from his pockets. Id. A Terry frisk must be carefully
limited to the outer layer of clothing in order to discover weapons that might be used to assault
the officer. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-1885. Although an officer need not
possess total certainty that a person is armed and dangerous, an officer's mere hunch or
unparticularized suspicion will not, in itself: justify a frisk. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct at
1883.
Having reviewed the police video, the Court does not believe a Terry frisk would have
been justified even if the stop had been a lawful one. Defendant did not give any indication that
he was armed or dangerous. He stopped his car when Officer Phillips flagged him down, was
polite and cooperative during the encounter, told Officer Phillips he did not have weapons in his
vehicle, and complied immediately when Officer Phillips asked him to step out of the car.
Nothing about Defendant's demeanor, language, or appearance indicated that he was armed or
dangerous. Thus, a Terry frisk was unreasonable and improper.
3. Even if the encounter between Officer Phillips and Defendant had been a lawful
one where a Terry frisk was justified, Officer Phillips exceeded the scope of Terry by
reaching into Defendant's pockets instead of confining the search to the outer layers
of Defendant's clothing

Finally, even if this had been a situation where a Terry frisk was appropriate, Officer
Phillips exceeded the scope of Terry by failing to limit the pat-down to the outer layers of
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Defendant's clothing. As set forth above, Terry and its progeny make clear that a pat-down for
weapons during an investigative detention must be limited to the outer layer of clothing. Here,
Officer Phillips reached into Defendant's pockets. Nothing in the record indicates that Officer
Phillips felt what he believed to be a weapon in the pocket as he patted down the outer lawyer of
clothing, or that he could identify through the fabric what he immediately recognized as
contraband. It is therefore plain to this Court that searching Defendant's pockets was improper.
For all of these reasons, the first baggie of methamphetamine will be suppressed.

C. The Second "Baggie" of Methamphetamine Does Not Fall Under the Attenuation
Exception and Thus Must Also Be Suppressed
The meat of the parties' dispute lies with the second baggie of methamphetamine
discovered on the Defendant's person. As explained above, Officers found the second baggie
after confirming a warrant for Defendant's arrest. This, the State argues, constitutes an
attenuating circumstance that purges the encounter of its illegality. The Defendant argues that
under the attenuation factors set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court, the second baggie of
methamphetamine should be suppressed.
Idaho courts have addressed the application of the attenuation exception in circumstances
where a valid warrant is discovered after officers initiate an unlawful encounter. In State v. Page,
the Idaho Supreme Court explained the attenuation exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. See 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004). There, an individual who was walking alone
at night was approached by an officer who asked if he could speak to him for a moment. Id. at
843, 103 P.3d at 456. The officer asked for his identification, and ran his information through
dispatch. Id. The officer discovered that the individual had an outstanding warrant for his arrest,
and arrested him. Id. In the search incident to the arrest, the officer discovered drugs and
paraphernalia in the individual's pocket. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the officer's
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contact with the Defendant, including the officer's request for the Defendant's driver's license,
was a consensual encounter that did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 844, 1083 P.3d at
456. However, because the trial judge had granted the motion to suppress on the basis that the
Page defendant was unlawfully seized, the Court evaluated the effect of an officer's discovery of
a valid warrant during an unlawful encounter. Id. The Court explained that the discovery of a
valid arrest warrant during an unlawful encounter may trigger the attenuation exception to the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Id. at 846, 1083 P.3d at 459. The Page Court enumerated
three factors for a court to consider when determining whether unlawful conduct has been
adequately attenuated: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the
evidence, (2) whether intervening circumstances occurred, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of
the improper law enforcement action. Id.
The Page Court leaned on United States v. Green, a 7th Circuit case with an ultimately
similar holding. Id. ("We find the attenuation analysis in Green to be persuasive."). In Green,
police stopped a car that they believed contained a fugitive. Id. (citing United States v. Green,
111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997)). Even though officers determined that the fugitive was not in the
car, the officers ran the information of the car's two occupants. Id. Officers discovered that one
of the occupants had an outstanding warrant, and arrested the occupant. Id. During the search
incident to the arrest, officers discovered contraband. Id. The Green Court acknowledged that the
encounter was unjustified. Id. Nevertheless, the Green Court determined that the contraband was
admissible because the discovery of a valid warrant constituted an attenuating factor. Id. In
deciding Page, the Idaho Supreme Court looked to Green while applying the three factors set
forth above:
Here, there was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the license and the
search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. The police officer's conduct was
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certainly not flagrant, nor was his purpose improper. Clearly, once the officer
discovered that there was an outstanding warrant, an intervening event under
Green, he did not have to release Page and was justified in arresting him at that
point. Once he had effectuated a lawful arrest, he was clearly justified in
conducting a search incident to that arrest for the purpose of officer or public
safety or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence. Therefore, it was not
unlawful for the officer to seize the drugs discovered incident to that arrest.
Id. at 846-47, 103 P.3d at 459-60. The year after the Idaho Supreme Court decided Page, the
Idaho Court of Appeals decided State v. Bingham. 141 Idaho 732, 117 P.3d 146 (Ct. App. 2005).
There, a patrol officer observed an individual walking down the street in a residential
neighborhood at about 4:00 am. Id. at 433, 117 P.3d at 147. The officer testified that it was
unusual for an individual to be out walking at that hour, and stated that his patrol duties in that
neighborhood usually included looking for prowlers or potential auto burglars. Id. The officer
stopped his patrol car, asked the defendant to speak to him, and requested the defendant's name.
Id. When the defendant told the officer his name, the officer remembered that he had seen the
defendant's name on a warrant list. Id. The officer confirmed the warrant through dispatch,
arrested the defendant, and performed a search incident to the arrest. Id. During the search, the
officer discovered methamphetamine, and the defendant was charged. Id. The defendant moved
to suppress the methamphetamine, contending that it was the product of an illegal stop. Id. When
the trial court denied his motion, he appealed. Id. The Bingham Court applied the attenuation test
and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. Id. at 735, 117 P.3d at 149. The Court reasoned
that the existence of a warrant for the defendant's arrest was an intervening circumstance that
weighed in favor of finding attenuation. Id. Though the district court had not made a factual
determination as to whether or not the initial encounter between the defendant and law
enforcement was a stop, the Bingham Court explained that even if the encounter were a stop, the
officer's conduct was not so flagrant as to tip the scale in favor of the defendant. Id. at 735, 117
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P.3d at 149. The Court noted that the encounter was relaxed, and that it was not outrageous for
an officer to question a person walking down a residential street at 4:00 am. Id. However, the
Bingham Court cautioned that Page does not stand for the proposition that discovery of a valid

warrant serves as a per se validation of previous improper conduct:
The Page decision provides no such comprehensive insulation of police
misconduct whenever an outstanding arrest warrant is discovered. Rather, in
Page, as in the Green case upon which Page relied, the Court applied the threepart attenuation test to the facts presented. The discovery of a warrant satisfies
only the second prong by showing an intervening circumstance. The other factors,
particularly "the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action,"
must be weighed in every case to determine whether the taint of that misconduct
is sufficiently attenuated.
141 Idaho at 734, 117 P.3d at 148. Conversely, in State v. Padilla, the Idaho Court of Appeals
declined to apply the attenuation doctrine. There, officers initiated an illegal search of a
defendant and found stolen items. 158 Idaho 184, 186, 345 P.3d 243, 244 (2014). Officers
arrested the defendant and transported him to jail. Id. At the jail, it was discovered that there was
an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest. Id. The Padilla defendant was found guilty of
grand theft of the stolen items at trial. Id. The defendant filed a post-conviction claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that his attorney should have filed a motion to
suppress. Id. The Padilla Court held that the attenuation doctrine did not apply, because the
evidence at issue was discovered prior to the discovery ofa valid warrant. Id. at 188, 345 P.3d
247. Turning now to the case at hand, the Court has determined that the application of the
attenuation factors tips the scale in favor of the Defendant.
(1) The elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence

At the time the warrant was confirmed in this case, Defendant had already been
improperly arrested and officers were preparing to test the white substance in the first baggie.
Officers were also in the beginning stages of conducting the search incident to that improper
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

91

14

-

-

arrest, asking Defendant about what else they might find in Defendant's vehicle. Because the
misconduct at issue was ongoing up to the moment when the warrant was confirmed, there was
virtually no time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence. The Court
therefore fmds that this factor weighs in favor of suppressing the second baggie of
methamphetamine.

(2) Whether intervening circumstances occurred
Idaho appellate courts describe the attenuation exception as applying in cases ''where the
causal chain has been sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the unlawful evidence."

Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184, 187, 345 P.3d 243, 246 (2014) (citing Page, 140 Idaho at 846,
103 P.3d at 459). Idaho appellate courts have held that the discovery of a valid arrest warrant
satisfies the second prong of the attenuation test. See State v. Bingham, 141 Idaho 732, 734, 117
P.3d 146, 148 (Ct. App. 2005); see generally Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454. However, a
critical fact distinguishes this case from other cases where Idaho courts of appeal have applied
the attenuation doctrine. In this case, the warrant was discovered after the Defendant had been
unlawfully arrested, and officers were already preparing to search Defendant's vehicle. And,
because Defendant had already been arrested, officers would have almost certainly performed a
more thorough search of Defendant's person incident to that arrest.
It appears to this Court that confirmation of the warrant did not alter the likely course of
the officers' conduct at all. Looking at the stream of events set forth in the record, it seems as
though the officers would have almost certainly discovered the second baggie of
methamphetamine with or without confirmation of the warrant from dispatch. Conversely, in the
cases discussed above, the existence of a valid warrant created an attenuating circumstance that
required officers to alter their course of conduct, thereby altering the causal chain.
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In examining this factor, the Court gives due weight to cases where appellate courts have
ruled that discovery of a valid warrant constitutes an attenuating circumstance. However, the
Court also gives weight to the fact that the confirmation of the warrant in this case does not
appear to have altered the "causal chain" of events, and thus did not provide the same degree of
"attenuation" as in other cases. In this set of circumstances, this Court believes that the second
attenuation factor is, at best, neutral.
(3) The purpose and flagrancy of the improper law enforcement action

Here, officers had neither the reasonable suspicion nor probable cause required for
initiating a stop. Under the case law discussed above, this alone would not necessarily be fatal.
However, officers in this case took the unlawful interaction much further than officers in other
cases applying the attenuation exception, going so far as to unlawfully search Defendant's
person, reach into his pockets, and ultimately effectuate an unlawful arrest of Defendant. It does
not appear that officers in this case had any ill will or improper motives. Nevertheless, the Court
cannot ignore the multiple procedural missteps that led to Defendant being improperly arrested
prior to confirmation of a valid warrant. Thus, the flagrancy factor also cuts in favor of the
Defendant.
The Court has concluded that the attenuation factors set forth by the Idaho Supreme
Court weigh in favor of suppressing the second baggie of methamphetamine. Defendant's
motion to suppress is therefore granted as to both the first and second baggies of
methamphetamine.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court has determined that both baggies of
methamphetamine were the fruit of an unlawful search in violation of Defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.

Geor e A. Southworth
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was forwarded
to the following persons on t h i s ~ day of October, 2016.

Ryan K. Dowell
Canyon County Public Defender
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave., Suite 120
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Dallin Creswell
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

95

18

•

•

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH DATE: October 31, 2016

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

COURT MINUTE

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO: CR2016-12011 *C
TIME: 1:00 P.M.
REPORTED BY:
Patricia Terry
DCRT2 (1 :04-1 :06)

This having been the time heretofore set for status conferen~e in the above
entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Dallin Creswell, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney for Canyon County, and the defendant was personally present in court, with
counsel, Mr. Ryan Dowell
The Court reviewed prior proceedings held, noted last week the Court issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting the Motion to Suppress and inquired if the
State intended to proceed on this matter.
Mr. Creswell requested the Court vacate the jury trial and set another status
conference in about a month to give the Attorney General a chance to look this case
over.

COURT MINUTES
October 31, 2016
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The Court vacated the jury trial and set this matter for status conference
November 28, 2016 at 1 :30 p.m.

The defendant was continued released on his own recognizance to Pretrial
Services.

Depuiyeierk

COURT MINUTES
October 31, 2016
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

District Court No. CR-2016-12011
Supreme Court No.
NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHIL D,

_____________
Defendant -Responde nt.

)
)

)

)

TO:
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD, THE ABOVE-N AMED
RESPOND ENT, RYAN K. DOWELL, CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDE R,
111 N. 11TH AVE., STE. 120, CALDWEL L, IDAHO 83605 AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-E NTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-nam ed appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the

above-nam ed responden t to the Idaho Supreme Court from the MEMORA NDUM
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTIN G DEFENDA NT'S MOTION TO SUPRESS ,

NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 1
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entered in the above-entitled action on the 26th day of October, 2016, the
Honorable George A. Southworth presiding. A copy of the Judgment or order
being appealed is attached to this notice; a copy of the final judgment is not
attached as no final judgment has been entered.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,

and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable
orders under and pursuantto Rule 11(c)(7), I.AR.

3.

Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district

court erred by concluding the discovery of an arrest warrant after the initial stop
was not an intervening circumstance justifying an arrest and search incident to
arrest regardless of the legality of the initial stop.
4.

To undersigned,s knowledge, no part of the record has been

sealed.

5.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of

the reporter's transcript:
Hearing on the motion to suppress held October 7, 2016 (Patricia Terry,
court reporter; less than 100 pages estimated).
6.

Appellant requests the nonnal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28,

7.

I certify:

I.AR.

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal rs being served on each

reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the
address set out below:
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PATRICIA TERRY
1115 Albany st.
Caldwell, ID 83605

(b)

That arrangements have been made with the Canyon

County Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's
transcript;
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee

for the preparation of the record because the State of Idaho is the appellant
{Idaho Code§ 31-3212);
(d)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in

a criminal case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8));
(e)

That service is being made upon all parties required to be

served pursuant to Rule 20, J.A.R.
DATED this 14th day of Novembef(, 2016.

\\
\

KENNETH K. JORGEN E
Deputy Attorney Gene I
Attorney for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of November, 2016, caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
THE HONORABLE GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH
Canyon County District Court

1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, 10 83605
BRYAN F. TAYLOR
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605
DALLIN J. CRESWELL
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605
RYAN K. DOWELL
Canyon County Public Defender's Office
111 N. 11th Ave., Ste. 120
Caldwell, ID 83605
PATRICIA TERRY
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605
HAND DELIVERY
STEPHEN W. KENYON
CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

KENNETH K. JORGEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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F I~~ E ct.M.
OCT 2 6 2016

RE CE IVED

CANYON COUN1YCLERK

B DOMINGUEZ, DEPUTY

OCT 2 6 2016
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
CANYON COUNTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

-vs-,

TAYLOR JAMES FAIJlCBllJ),

Defendant.

CR-2016-12011
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ODDER GRANTING
DEFEND.ANT'S MOTION TO
SlJPPRESS

}

Defendant Taylor James Fairchild bas filed a motion to suppress. For the following

reasonss the Comt has gr&Dted his motion.

rRoCEDURAL 'RJBIQRX
Defendant

has

been

cbar&ed

with

possession of a

controlled

substance

(methamphetam,ine), a felony under Idaho Code section 37-2732(c)(l). On August 5, 2016, be

entered a plea ofnot guilty. He filed a motion to suppress on September 2, 2016. The State filed
an objection to Defendant's motion on September 27,-2016. A hearing was held on Defendant's

motion on October 7, at which time the C.Owt took this matter wider advisement. On October 11,
2016, the State filed an affidavit prepared by Officer Bric Phillips in support of the State~s
objection to Defendant's motion. On October 13, 2016, the State also filed a supplelllellt to its
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objection to Defendant's motion. The same day, Defendant filed a memorandum of law in

support of its motion to suppress.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The follow-mg facts are derived from the brie~ affidavits, and evidence submitte4, by
the parties. At about 8:30 am on July 8, 2016, Caldwell resident Layne Stark c:ontacted the
sheriffs office to report two men sittmg

ma

truck parked near bis house. When cUspatch

answered bis call, Stark said, "I was wondering if I could have somebody sent out. I'm a little
concerned about a transaction or somsthing going down behind my house." The dispatcher asked

him what was taking pla~ and he replied, "two cars just come up really fast and pU11 around and

meet up and they get out and they're just both just sitting in the tr'llclc: together . . . It could be

nothing but too often thlngs happen. back there and the way they pulled up so :&st it looks like
[unintelligi"ble]." Stark provided dispatch with the make, description, and license plate numbers
of both vehicles. One was J red Dodge Ram pickup. The other was a dark-colored Hyundai.
Stark stated that two individuals bad been sitting in the truck fur about ten minutes. In adc:Ution to
providing the description and license plate numbers of the vehicles, Stark provided bis home
address and identified Laster Lane and Lathrop Avenue as nearby streets. Officer Eric Phillips

was dispatched to the area. While en route., he r.an the plate numbers provided by Stark and

discovered that the Dodge pickup was registered to Philip Daniel Wietz, whom Officer Phillips
knew ftom previous experience to be a drug user.
When Officer Pbillips arrived. he ooticed both vehicles driving away from the scene. The

Dodge dtove away :from Officer Phillips in the direction of Indiana Avenue. The Hyundai-driven by Defendant-headed down Laster Lane toward OtDcer Phillips. As the car approached

him, Officer Phillips flicked his overhead. li&hts and stuck his hand out the patrol car window to
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motion the Defendant to stop. The Defendant complied:
Officer Phillips• body camera video footage shows that Defendant stopped his ca:r on a
portion of Later Lane that runs between what appears to be a well-kept subdivision full ofnewerlooking homes on one side, and a field of farmland on the other. The footage also shows that it
was daytime and sunny outside during the encotlllter.
After stopping Defendant, Officer Phillips walked toward Defendant's car and requested
that Defendant provide his identification. Defendant handed Officer Phillips his driver's license,

and Officer Phillips rad.ioe.d Defendant 1s information into dispatch. He then began questioning
Defendant about where Defendant was coming from, and whether he had been interacting with
the driver of the red pickup truck. Defendant told Officer Phillips that he was in the area because

he had spent the night at a friend's house, and denied having contact with the driver of the
pickup truck.

Officer Phillips told Defendant that "[y]ou guys got called in for being parked back here •
People were just concerned because nonna.1ly people don't park back here. There was two
vehicles parked next to each other/' Officer Phillips continued to question Defendant about what

he had been doing in the area, and Defendant continued to deny being mvolved with the driver of
the red truck.
Officer Phillips instrl,lcted Defendant to turn off bis vehicle and asked Defendant if he
was on p,:obation. Defendant replied that he was on probation <tout of Pocatello Idaho" for a
paraphernalia charge. Officer Phillips to Id Defendant to step out of the car and asked Defendant
to allow him to search hinl.. Defendant obeyed. Officer Phillips patted him down, but also
reached into Defendant's pan.ts pockets. It does not appear from Officer Phillips' video that there

was any indication that Defendant was armed or dangerous. After reaching into one of
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Defendant's pockets, Offic..,r Phillips ibund and removed a small baggie of a white powdered
substance. Officers immediately arrested Defendant, pJaced him in handcuffs, and read Iris

Miranda rights.
Officer Phillips med another officer at the scene to watch the Defendant so he could get
gloves from his patrol car. Officer Phillips then walked to his patrol car, opened the trunk, and

used his radio to report that he bad found methamphetamine on the Defendant. Officer Phillips
retrieved disposable groves ftom the tnink. Officer Phillips walked back to Defendant and asked,
"'what else do you have in here?" Defendant replied, but bis reply is unintelligible on the body

ca.meta footage. Officer Phillips then stated, ''Ok so you do have a warrant • , • out of Pocatello .

. . so you are under arrest for that." On the body camera footage, the audio did not pick up the
precise moment when Officer Phillips received confirmation of Defendant's warrant. However,
Officer Phillips' affidavit makes clear that the wammt was not confirmed until after the officers
conducted the initial search, round the methamphetamine, and arrested Defendant:
during the detention of Defendant, another officer watched D e ~ while I
opened th.e trunk of my patrol vehicle •.. subsequent to opeomg the trunk of my
patrol vehicle, I aaain contacted Defendant[. D]uring the second contact with
Defendant I infQrmed hhn that he was under aq-est :fbr the warrant . , • by the time
I in.formed defendant he was under am:st :fur the wa(l'aOt, Canyon County
Sheri:trs Office Dispatch had confirmed that there was a watTant, and I know that
is tme because based on my common practice of handling warrant ~ts I would
not have made that statement as heard iQ. the video ~ s the wammt had been
confirmed . . . subsequent to inibrming Defendant he was under arrest fur tp.e
warrant, and thus subsequent to the Canyon County Sheriff's Officer Dispatch
coDfirming the existence of a warrant against D~endan.t, I discovered a second
baggie ofwhite crystal substance.
A.If. of Eric Phillips,

Oct£ 11 2016, pg. 2. The bc;,dy camera video shows that Officer Phillips

opened his trunk, retrieved disposal gloves, and put them on. After retummg ftom his trunk with
the gloves, Officer Phillips asked Defendllllt what else he had ''in there" ~ore telling him. about
the warrant. Tiiis sequence of events indicates that the wmant was confirmed either after Officer
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Phillips bad asked Defendant what else he bad "in there," or while Officer Phillips was asking
the question.

After Officer Phillips told Defendant that the warrant had been confirmed, he finished
searching Defendant. A second baggie ofwhite cryst.al substance was found mDefendmrt,s pants
pocket. The substance in both baggies was positively identified as methamphetamine, and

Defendant was char&ed with possession of a controlled substance.
ANALYSIS

Defendant has argued that the responding officers did not have reasonable suspicion to

stop the Defendant; that the scope of the stop exceeded the stop's initial purpose; and that there
were no intervening circumstances sufficient to purge the illegality of the stop. Thus, the
Defendant argues. the m.ethamphetamine discovered in Defendant's car should be suppressed as
fruit ofthe poisonous tree. The State bas argued that the citizen's phone call and Officer Phillips'

prior lmowledge of the individual to whom the Dodge truck was registered was sufficient to
create reasonable suspicion. The State also argues that the second baggie of metbamphetamine is

admissible under the attenuation exception to the truit ofthe poisonous tree doctrine.
A. The Initial Stop of Defendant Was Not Justified By Reasonable Suspicion

It appears that the State is not disputing that the initial encounter with Defendant was a
stop. The Fourth Amendmmt of the United States Constitution and its collllterpart, Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right of every citizen to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. CardellQS, 143 Idaho 903, 906, 15S P.3d 704, 707
(CL App. 2006); see also Ter,y v. Ohto, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16 (1968).
But not all enco'Ullters between police and citizens implicate the Fourth Amendment. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 8-9, 88 S. Ct. at 1873. A seizure does not occur shnply because a police
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officer approaches a person and asks him if he is willing to answer some questions.

See

Cardenas at 143 Idaho at 907, 15S P.3d at 708; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434,
111 S. a. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 398 (1991). Only when an officer, by means of

physical force or show of authority, restrams the hl>erty of a citizen is that citizen seized. State v.
Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 4S6 (2004). Whether or not a stop has occurred

depends upon whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the defendant would have felt free to
ignore the police presence and go about his business. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434j
111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed._2d 389 (1991). In this cas~ Oflicer Phillips flicked his overhead
lights and flagged down the Defendant. There is no questio~ that Defimdant was stopped.

Furthermore, there is little doubt that the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. Police officers may temporarily detfllll a person in order to investigate possible
criminal behavior. even when the officer does not have enough probable cause to make an arrest.

See State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102-104, 831 P,2d 942, 944-946 (O. App. 1991); see also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct at 1880. In order to pass constitutional n:mster, an investigatory
seizure, or 'fstop," must be justified by the officer"s reasonable, ~ b l e suspicion that the

person seized bas committed or was about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411,101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 621 (1981). Whethecornot auofficerhasreasonablesuspicion to

conduct an investigatory seizure depends upon the totality ofthe ~oes-the in1t,n.nation
known to the officer at the time ofthe stop must yield a particularized and objective basis fur the

officer,s suspicion. S-ta.te v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. App. 2004),
In determining whether or not a stop was justified. courts do not give weight to an officer's
hunch or unparticulari%ed suspicion, but instead. to specific reasonable inf~ces that the officer

entitle4 to draw from the fa~ based. on his experience. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct.
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at 1883. The Supreme Cowt held in Illinois v. Wardlow that officers had reasonable, articulable

suspicion to stop a suspect in a known narootics trafficking area

when the suspect ran upon

seeing the police. 528 U.s. 119, 120 s.a. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981 ). The Court reasoned that
the high-drug neighborhood, and the fact that the suspect actually ran from the police gave rise to

the police officer's reasonable suspicion that crime was a:fbot. Id. But in Brown v. Te.x-a.s, the

Supreme Court held that an individual's presence in a high-drug neighborhood a t ~ in the
absence of other factors, is not enough to give rise to reasonable smpicion that crime is afoot.

See Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed. 357 (1979).
Reasonable suspicion can arise from an informant's tip or from a citizen's report of
suspicious activity. See .Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990); see also Wilson

v. Idaho Tnmsp. Dept, 136 Idaho 270, 32 P.3d 164 (Ct. App. 2001). Whether the information
provided by a citizen or an infurmant is sufflcie.o.t to create reasonable suspicion that justifies a

st.op depends upon the content and the reliability of the in:tbrmation presented by the source;
including whether the informant reveals his identity and the basis of his knowledge. Id. at 330,

110 S. Ct. at 2416; 136 Idaho at 27S, 32 P.3d at 169.
In this case, the State has emphasized ~t the tip the officers received was reliable,
because the caller provided his name, address, and numerous details about the circumstances he

desc:ribed-inclucling the precise 1ocation, a description of the vehicles, and ooirect license plate
numbers. This C.O\Ut agrees that the information provided. by the caller was plainly reliable.

However, both content and reliability are required fur a citizen's tip to create reasonable
suspicion. In this case, the caller simply stated that two

cais

were parlced alongside the road, and

that two people had been sitting in one of the cars for ten minutes. The caller even stated that it
could be ''nothing."
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In order to determine whether the officer's stop of Defendant was justified in this case,
this Court has looked, as it must, to the facts known by the offic.er at the time of the encounter.
The facts known to Officer Phillips at the time he detained. the Defendant were that on a bright,

sunny morning. in a subdivision full of newer-looking homes, a concemeq. resident reported that
a car and a truck pulled up and parked on the street, and that two men sat in one of the vehicles
fur about ten minutes. The callCf speculated that the

IO.ell

oould be engaging in an unspecified

"transaction," but also speculated that it could be "nothio.g.9' The caller did not report seeing the
men doing drugs or otherwise breaking the law. The only other information that Officer Pbillips
had upon arriving at the scene was that the Dodge pickup (not the vehicle driven by the
Defendant) had been registered to an individual (also not the Defendant) who bad been mvolved
with drugs :in the past.
No matter how reliable the source of the tip in this

case. the content of the tip and the

facts available to Officer Phillips upon his arrival at the scene were simply not enough to create
reasonable, articu.lable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime.
In light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. Texa.r that a suspect's

presence in a high drug neighborhood at night was not safficient to ci:eate reasonable suspicion,
this Court CSDDOt justify ~ing reasonable suspicion based on Defendant's presence in a well-

kept subdivision on a bright, sunny UJOming. While it is 1l1:1e that ·Defendant may have spent ten
minutes sitting in a truck that was registered to an individual who had used drugs in the p~ it is

unclear whether that was even the same individual driving the truck that da.y. The caller did not
state that he saw either man consume drugs, or that he saw mo~ey chm;lge hands. There js no
indication that the area was a high-crime or high-drug neighborhood. At. best, Defendant's
presence in the truclc could give rise to a lnmch or a generalized sense of suspicion. In the
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absence of any articulable facts indicating that crime was afuot, this Court has concluded that the
initial stop was unlawful
B. The First

Ban~ of Meth.amphetamine

is Fniit of the Poisonous Tree and Therefore

Shall Be Sttppressed
l. Because the initial stop was unlawful, the fint baggie will be suppressed as frnit
of the poisonous tree

Having deten:oined that the initial stop w~ unlawful, the Court must conclude that the
first baggie of methalllphetamiae is inadmissible as fi:uit of the poisonous tree. The fruit of the

poisonous tree doctrine is well-settled---evidence obtained in violation ofthe Fourth Am~ment
generally may not be used as evidence agamst the victim of illegal government action. See Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 (1963); see also State v, Page, 140

Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 4S9 (2004). Because the initial stop was unJawful, and because the
discovery of the first baggie of methamphetamine was the product of that unlawful stop, tbis
Court must exclude the first baggie of methamphetamine as the fh.rlt of the poisonous tree. 1

l. Even if the initfa.l stop had b'-8n i.wful, a Tury :frisk was improper, and thus,
the first baggie -would be suppressed as fruit of th~ lll11awful frisk
Even if the initial stop were legal, the subsequent pat-down of Defendant would still
preclude admission of the first baggie of methamphctamine. Where an officer bas sei?.ed a

defendant fur an investigatory search. tbat officer may conduct a·limtted pat--down search of the

outer Jayers of a person's clothing all over his body to find weapons. Terry v. Ohio) 392 U.S. 1,
16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968). A '7erry'' frisk is only permissible when, at the moment ofthe

frisk, the officer has reason to belieV'e that the individual he is investigating is armed and
dangerous, and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer's belief. Id. at 24,
2.

l'.n i:t$ suppleme0.tal briefing. the State urged the Court to find the 6rst baggie ofmctbam.phetamine admissible

UJlder the inevitable discovery doctrine. an argimLCDt -that would have require_d tbis Court to find the initial stop tO be
lawm.l. Becaue tbis Court bmd tbe imtial stop to be lJl11awful, 1he Court will not address the State•s arpment OD
inevitable discovery.
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88 S.Ct. at 1881. An officer's belief that a defendant is armed and ~erous must be objectively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and depends upon whether a reasonably
prodent person would be justified in concluding that an :individual posed a risk of danger. Stats v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660.-61, 1S2 P.3d 16, 21-22 (2007). A Teny frisk can be justified when

officers can see a bulge in a Defendant1 s pocket that resembles a w~on. See State v. Holler,
136 Idaho 287, 292, 32 P.3d 679~ 684 (Ct. App. 2001). Comts may also take into ac.count a

Defeudant's refusal to remoYe his hands from bis pockets. Id. A Terry frisk must be carefully
limited to the outer layer of clothing in order to discover weapo~ that might be used to assault
the officer. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 1 88 S.Ct. at 1884-1885• .Although an officer need not

possess total certainty that a person is armed and dangero~ an officer's mere hunch or
unparticularized suspicion will not, in itsel~ jumfy a fHsk. Tenyt 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct at

1883.
Having reviewed the police video, the Court does not believe a Teny fiisk would have

been justified even if the stop had been a lawful one. Defendant dip not &i,ve any indication that
he was armed or dangerous. He stopped his car when Officer Phillips flagged him down,

was

polite and cooperative d'Uring the encounter, told Officer Phillips he did not have weapon, in his
vehicle, II.Id complied jmmedia1;ely w~en Officer Phillips asked bim. to step out of the car.
Nothing about Defendant's demeanor, language, or appearance indicated that he was armed or
dangerous. Thus, a Teny fiisk was umeasonable and improper.

3. Even if the encoll.Xlter between. Officer Phillips and Def'en4ant had been a lawful
one where a Terry ~ was justified, Officer Phiffips ~ceed4;d the scope of Ter,y by
reaching Into Defen.dant's pockets instead- of confining 1he seai'Cb. to the outer layers
of Defendant', clo.tldll:
Finally, even

if this had been a $ituation where a Terry frisk was appropriate, Officer

Phillips e:x.ceeded the scope of Terry by failing to :limit the pat-down to the outet layers of
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Defendant's clothing. As set forth above, Terry and its progeny make clear that a pat-down fur
weapons during an investigative detention must be limited to the outer layer of clothing. Here,

Officer Phillips reached :into Defendant's pockets. Nothing in the· record indicates that Officer
Phillips feh what he believed to be a weapon in the pocket as he patted down the outer lawyer of

clotbm.& or that he could identify tbrough the &bric what he immed!ately recognized as
contraband. It is theremre plain to this Court that searchlng Defendant's pockets was improper.
For all ofthese reasons, the first baggie ofmetbamphetamine will be suppressed.

C. The Second "Baggie'' of Methamphetam.ine Does Not Fall Under the Atten,uatlon
Exception ud Thus Must Also Be Suppressed
The meat of the parties, dispute lies with the second baggic of methamphetanilile
discovered on the Defendant's person. AB explained above, 0 ~ found the second baggic

after oonfirmi:ng a warrant tor Defendant's arrest. This, the State argues, constitutes an
attenuating circumstance .that purges the encounter of its illegality. The D~eudaDt argues that
under the attenuation factors set fbrth by the Idaho Supreme Court, the second baggie of

metbamphetamine should be suppressed.
Idaho courts have addressed the application of the attenuation exception in circumstances
p

where a valid warrant is discovered after officers initiate an unlawful encounter. In Sta~ -v. Page,
the Idaho Supreme Court explahled the attenuation exception to the ftuit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. See 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004). There, an individual who was wallciDg alone

at night was approached by an officer who asked if he could speak to him fur a moment. Id.

at

843, 103 P.3d at 456. The oflicer asked for his identitlcaticn, and ran his mfonnatio:c. through
dispatch. Id. The officer discovered that the individual had an outstanding warrant fur his arrest,

and arrested him Id. In the search incident to the meat, the officer discovered drugs and
paraphernalia in the individual's pocket. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the officer's
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contact with the Defendant, including the officer's request for the Defendant's driver's license,
was a consensual encounter that did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 844, 1083 P.3d at
4S6. However, because the trial judge had granted the motion to suppress on the basis that the

Page defendant was unlawfully seized, the Court evaluated the effect of an officer's discovery of

a valid Wllll'ant during an unlawful encounter, Id. The Court explained that the discovery of a
valid arrest warrant during an unlawful encounter may trigger the attenuation exception to the
ftuit of the poisonous tree doctrine, Id, at 846, 1083 P.3d at 459. The Page Court enumerated
three factors ibr a co~ to consider when detenninmg whether unlawfW. cqnduct has been
adequately attenuated: (1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the

evidence; {2) whether intervenfug circumstance$ occurred, and (3) the pUrp<>se and flagrancy of
the improper law enforcement action. Id.
The Page Comt leaned on United Smtes v. Gree11, a 7th Circuit case with an ultimately
similar holding. Id. ("We tuid the att/30,uation analysis in Green to be persuasive."). In Green,

police stopped a car that they believed contained a fugitive. Id. (citing United States v. Green,
I 11 F, 3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997)). Even though oftlcezs determined that the fugitive was not bl the
car, the officers ran the infi>rmation of the car's two occupants. Id. Officers discovered that one
of the occupants had

an outstanding warrant. and arrested the occupant. Id.

During the search

incident to the arrest, officers disco-vered contraband, Id. The Green Court acknowledged that the
encounter wa UQ.justi:fied. Id. Nevertheles~ the Green Court detennined that the contraband was
admissible because the discovery of a valid warrant constituted an attenuating factor. Id. In
deciding Page, the Idaho Supreme Court looked to Green while applying the tbree factors set
forth above:

Here. there was "- mmimal lapse of time between the $eizure ofthe license and the
search pursuant to a valid arrest wammt. The police officer's conduct was
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certainly not flagrant, nor was his purpose improper. Clearly, once the officer
discovered that there was an outstanding warrant, an intervening event under
Green. he did not have to release Page and was justified in arresting him at fl¥t.t
point. Once he bad effectuated a lawful arrest., he was clearly justified in
conducting a search incident to that arrest fur the purpose of officer or public
safety or to prevent conceahnent or destruction of evidence. Therefore, it w~ not
unlawful for the officer to seize the drugs disoovered incident to that arrem.

Id. at 846-47. 103 P.3d at 459-60. The year after the Idaho Supreme Court decided Page, the
Idaho Court of Appeals decided State v. Bingham. 141 Idaho 732, 117 P.3d 146 (Ct. App. 2005).

There, a patrol officer observed an individual walking down the street in a residential
neighborhood at about 4:00 am. Id. at 433, 117 P.3d at 147. The officer testified that it was
unusual fur an individual to be out walking at tbat hour, and stated that his patrol duties in that
neighborhood usually included looking for prowlers or potential auto burglars. Id. The officer
stopped bis patrol car, asked the defendant to speak to

him) and requested the defendant's name.

Id. When the defendant told the officer his name, the officer remembered that he had seen the
defendant's name on a warrant list. Id. The officer confitmed the warrant through dispatch,
arrested the defendants and performed a search incident to the arrest. Id. During the search, the
officer discovered m.ethamphetamine, and the defendant was charged, Id. The defendant moved
to suppress the ro.etbamphetanrlne, contending that it was the product of an illegal stop. Id. When

the trial court denied his m,otion, he appealed. Id. The Bingham Court applied the attenuation test
and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. Id. at 735, 117 P.3d at 149. The

Court reasoned

that the existence of a wanant fur the defendant~$ arrest was an intervening circumstance that

weighed in favor of finding attenuation. Id. Though the district court had not made a factual
determination as to whether or not the initial encounter between the defendant and law
enforcement was a stop, the Bingham Court explained that even if the encounter were a stop, the
officer•s conduct was not so flagrant ~ to tip the scale iD favor of the defendant. Id. at 735, 117
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P.3d at 149. The Court noted that the encounter was relaxed, and that it was not outrageous

mr

an officer to question a person walking down a residential street at 4:00 am. Id. However, the

Bingham Court cautioned that Page does not stand for the proposition that discovery of a valid
warrant serves as a per se validation of previous improper conduct:
The Page decision provides no such comprehensive insulation of police
misconduct whenever an outstanding arrest warrant is discovered. Rather, in
Page, as in the Green c~ upon which Page relied, the Court applied the threepart attenuation test to the mets presented. ·The discovery of a warrant satisfies
only the second prOllg by showing an intervening circwnstance. The other factors,
particularly f'the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action,u
must be weighed ill every etie to determine whether the taint of that misconduct
is sufficiently attenuated.
141 Idaho at 734, 117 P.3d at 148, C.Onversely, in Srare v. Padilla, the Idaho Court of Appeals

declined to apply the attenuation doctrine. There,. officers initiated an illegal search of a

defendant and found stolen items, 158 Idaho 184, 186, 345 P.3d 243, 244 (2014). Oflicers
arrested the defeJJdant and transported him to jail Id. At the jail, it was discovered that there was
an outstanding warrant fi)r the defendant"s arrest. Id. The Padilla defendant was fumid guilty of
grand theft of the stolen items at trial Id, The defendant filed a post-conviction claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that bis attomey should have filed a motion to
suppress. Id. The Padilla Court held that the attenuation doctrine did not apply, because the
evidence at issue was discovered prior to the discovery of a valid warrant. Id. at 188, 345 P.3d
247. Turning now to the case at hand, the Court bas determined that the application of the

attenuation factors tips the scale in favor oftbe Defendant.
(1) The elapsed t)nze between the misconduct 12nd the acquisition qfthe evidence
At the time the wammt was c o ~ in this case, Defendant had already been

improperly anested and officers were preparing to test~ white substance in the first baggie.
Officers were also in ~ beginning stages of conducting the search incident to that improper
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arrest, asking Defendant about what else they might find in Defendant's vehicl~. Because the

misconduct at issue was ongoing up to the moment when the warrant was confirmed, there was

virtually no time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence. The Court
therefore finds that this factor w ~ in favor of suppressing the second baggie of
methamphetamine.

(2) Whether intervening circumstances occurred
Idaho appellate courts descn.be the ·attenuation exception as applying mcases "where the
camal chain has been sutlicieritly attenuated to dissipate the taint of the unlawful evidence."

Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184, 187, 345 P.3d 243, 246 (2'>14) (citing Page, 140 Idaho at 846,
103 P .3d at 459). Idaho appellate courts have held that the discovery of a valid arrest warrant

satisfies the second prong of the attc:11uation test. See Sta'te v. Bingham, 141 Idaho 732, 734, 117
P.3d 146, 148 (Ct. App. 2005); see generally Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454. However, a
critical fact distinguishes this case from other cases where Idaho courts of appeal have applied
the attenuation doctrine. In this case, the warrant was discovered ofter the Defendant

bad been

unlawfully arrested, and officers were already preparing to seuch Defendant's vehicle. And,

because Defendant had already been arrested, officers would have almost certainly perfurmed a
1110re thorough search of Defendant's person incident to that arrest.

It appears to this Court that conflrmation of the warrant did not alter the likely course of
the offi~· c.onduct at all. Looldng at the stream of events set ibrth in the record, it seems as
though the officers would have aJmost certainly discovered the second baggie of

tnethamphetamine with or without oonfinnation of the warrant from dispatch. Conversely, in the
cases discussed above. the existence of a valid wamm.t created an attenuating circumstance that
required officers to alter their oolll'Se of conduct, thereby altering the causal chain,
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In examining this factor, the Court gives due weight to cases where appellate courts have
ruled that discovery of a valid warrant coDStitutes an attenuating circumstance. However, the

Court also gives weight to the fact that the confirmation of the warrant in this case does not
appear to have altered the "causal chain" of event~ and thus did not provide the same degree of
~ttenuation" as

mother cases. In this set of circumstances, this Court believes that the second

attenuation fa.ct.ox is, at best, neutral.

(3) The purpose and.flagrancy of the improper law enforcement action
Here, officers had neither the reasonable suspicion nor probable cause reg_u.ired fur
initiating a stop. Under the case law discussed above, this alone would not necessarily be fatal.
However~ officers in this case took the unlawful interaction mu.ob further than officers :in other
cases applying the attenuation exoeptio:a,, going so filr as to unlawfully search D e ~ ' s

person, reach into bis pockets, and ultimately effectuate an uulaw:6.tl arrest of Defendant. It does
not appear that officers in this case had any ill will or improper motives. Nevertheless, the Court
cannot ignore the multiple procedural missteps tbat led to Defendant being improperly attested

prior to confimlation of a valid warrant. Thus,. the flagrancy factor also ~s in favor of the
Defendant.
The Court has concluded that the attenuation factors set furth

by the Idaho Supreme

Court weigh in favor of suppressing the second baggie of methamphctamme. Deten.dantts
motion to suppress is therefore granted as to both the &st and second baggies of

metba.mphetami.n.e.
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CONCLUSION

For all of the foregomg reasons, the Court has determined that both baggies of
methamphetamine were the fruit of an unlawful search in violation of Defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.

THUS, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant"s motion to suppress is GRANTED.
DATE

~_i

~ e r : , 2016.
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CERmI,,,C,A-TE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and oorrect copy of the foregoing Order was fonvard.ed.

to the following persons on this

,Ct,

day of October, 2016.

Ryan K Dowell
Canyon County Public Defender
Canyon County Administratio n Building
111 N. 11 th Ave., Suite 120
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Dallin Creswell
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
11 I 5 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH DATE: November 28, 2016

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
Defendant.

)
)

COURT MINUTE

)

CASE NO: CR2016-12011*C

)
)
)
)
)
)

TIME: 1:30 P.M.
REPORTED BY:
Patricia Terry
DCRT2 (144-147)

This having been the time heretofore set for status conference in the above entitled
matter, the State was represented by Mr. Dallin Creswell, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for
Canyon County, and the defendant was personally present in court, represented by counsel, Mr.
Ryan Dowell.
The Court called the case, noted the State had filed a notice of appeal on the Court's
decision suppressing evidence and this matter would be stayed pending results of the appeal.
Mr. Dowell requested the Court removed the defendant from Pretrial Services and
presented argument in support.
Mr. Creswell advised the Court the State had no objection.
The Court granted releasing the defendant from Pretrial Services.
The defendant was released on his own recognizance.

COURT MINUTE
November 28, 2016
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

CaseNo.

ORDER FOR

re ,a erv
Release on Own Recognizance
Commitment on Bond

)

)
defe d

)
)

t,

Ot:-f&,A--t>11-(

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant abide by the following conditions of release:

t!_Defendant is Ordered released
~ n own recognizance

D

D

Placed on probation

Case Dismissed

D Bond having been set in the sum of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ D Total Bond
D Bond having been D increased

D

reduced to the sum of$ _ _ _ _ _ __

OTota1Bond

D Upon posting bond, defendant must report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services office as stated below:
D Defendant shall report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services Office and follow the standard reporting conditions:
D Comply with a curfew designated by the Court or standard curfew set by Pretrial Services _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
D Not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or mood altering substances without a valid prescription.
D Submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol and/or drugs as requested by Pretrial Services at defendant's expense.
D Not operate or be in the driver's position of any motor vehicle.
D Abide by any No Contact Order and its conditions.
D Submit to D GPS D Alcohol monitoring as directed by Pretrial Services.
Defendants Ordered to submit to GPS or alcohol monitoring shall make arrangements with a provider
approved by Pretrial Services, prior to release.

OTHER: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
Failure by defendant to comply with the rules and/or reporting conditions and/or requirements of release as
Ordered by the Court may result In the revocation of release and return to the custody of the Sheriff.

Dated:

;l-r);g-.-Rf't7t Slg,ed:

Jerhlte .

Court

M.£

lsJ,yellow - Jail/Pretrial Services

,e~~\
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Judge

~nk - Defendant

10/11

_.

..
Cindy Robinson
From:
To:

Sent:
Subject:

•

•

Microsoft Outlook
Pre Trial
Monday, November 28, 2016 02:18 PM
Delivered: FW: Scanned from a Xerox Multifunction Printer: Fairchild

Your message has been delivered to the following recipients:
Pre Trial {PTrial@canyonco.org)
Subject: FW: Scanned from a Xerox Multifunction Printer: Fairchild
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Ryan K. Dowell, Deputy Public Defender, ISB #7796
Marc Bybee, Deputy Public Defender, ISB #9245
Tera A. Harden, Chief Public Defender, ISB #6052
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave, Suite 120
Caldwell, ID 83605
Telephone: 208-649-1818
Facsimile: 208-649-1819
Email: rdowell@canyonco.org
Attorneys for the Defendant

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
E BULLON, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO
Case No. CR-2016-12011

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO APPOINT STATE
PPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD

Defendant.
COMES NOW, TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD, the above-named Defendant,
by and through counsel of the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, Ryan K.
Dowell, and moves this Court pursuant to LC. 19-870(l)(a) to appoint the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office to represent Defendant on all matters pertaining to the direct
appeal filed in this case on November 14, 2016, as he is indigent as evidenced by
previous representation by the Canyon County Public Defender's Office
Dated this 1st of December, 2016.

Ryan Dowell, Deputy Public Defender
Attorney for the Defendant
MOTION TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER CR-2016-12011- pg.
1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 1st day of December, 2016, a copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER was served on the
following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[x] Hand Delivery-Court Mailbox
[ ] Electronic Mail

Clerk of the Court-Criminal Proceeding
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street, Rm 201
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[x] Hand Delivery
[ ] Electronic Mail

Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery-Court Mailbox
[ ] Electronic Mail

State of Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Proceedings
700 W. Jefferson St.
Boise, Idaho 83720

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Electronic Mail

DATED this First day of December, 2016.

Canyon County Public Defender's Office

MOTION TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER CR-2016-12011- pg.
2
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK

M.NYE,DEPUTY

Ryan K. Dowell, Deputy Public Defender, ISB #7796
Tera A. Harden, Chief Public Defender, ISB #6052
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
Canyon County Administration Building
111 N. 11 th Ave, Suite 120
Caldwell, ID 83605
Telephone: 208-649-1818
Facsimile: 208-649-1819
Email: rdowell@canyonco.org

Attorneys for the Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO
Case No. CR-2016-12011

Plaintiff,

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER

vs.
TAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD
Defendant.

WHEREAS, the State of Idaho has elected to pursue direct appeal in the above
named matter. Defendant being indigent and having heretofore been represented by the
Canyon County Public Defender's Office in the district court, this court finds that, under
these circumstances, appointment of appellate counsel is justified. Pursuant to Idaho
Code 19-870(l)(a), the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender shall be appointed to
represent the above-named defendant in all matter pertaining to the appeal filed in this
matter.
/,

day of December, 2016.

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, CR-2016-12011- pg. 1
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on t h e ~ day of J)eC:eM~Ol6, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document, ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[x] Hand Delivery-Court Mailbox
[ ] Electronic Mail

Clerk of the Court-Criminal Proceeding
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street, Rm 201
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[x] Hand Delivery
[ ] Electronic Mail

Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[] Hand Delivery-Court Mailbox
[ ] Electronic Mail

State of Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Proceedings
700 W. Jefferson St.
Boise, Idaho 83720

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Electronic Mail

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, CR-2016-12011- pg. 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintiffAppellant,
-vsTAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
DefendantRespondent.

Case No. CR-16-12011*C

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify the following
exhibits used at the Preliminary Hearing:

State's Exhibits:
1

Copy of ISP Analysis Report

Admitted

Sent

The following exhibits were used at the Motion to Suppress Hearing:

State's Exhibits:
1

CCSO Call Detail Report

Admitted

Sent

2

CD

Admitted

Sent

3

DVD

Admitted

Sent

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 21st day of December, 2016 .
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PlaintiffAppellant,
-vsTAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD,
DefendantRespondent.

Case No. CR-16-12011 *C

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled case was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including all documents lodged or filed as requested
in the Notice of Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 21th day of December, 2016.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.
By: ,,e , _ J ~ ~
Deputy

..........

,,,

,,,,,,, 0\STA1 ,,,,,,, ,

,,

•••••••• cJ-,,

"'
• iAT~
••
'
~";ye•S
,;;:o••(')--

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

$~l,..('$,(-~\Oi
'"'•c··
,- •
.:
::c:-•~
:c
::c:::c:
o•-t:
:•::r:;•·~
0 •O

..01s,~".. ,,,,..,

c\.J"/\•o
• V
• i<'

o:.

:
:
.•
••
', .,,.. %:c••
C"N'(O~
••"':,
,.,
14"! ••••••
C," ,......

',,,,,,l

.

,,,,,.~
128

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintiffAppellant,
-vsTAYLOR JAMES FAIRCHILD
DefendantRespondent.

Supreme Court No. 44617-2016
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy
of the Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcripts to the attorney of
record to each party as follows:

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender's Office,
322 East Front Street, Suite 570, Boise, Idaho 83702
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 21st day of December, 2016.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho
in and for the County of Canyon.
,,,,,11 11111 •,,ij)_'.=~ ~~
Deputy
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TO:

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
Fax:

334-2616
Docket No.

44617-2016

(Res)

State of Idaho

(App)

vs.
Taylor James Fairchild
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on December 20,
2016,

I

lodged O

&

3 transcripts of the Motion to

Suppress Hearing dated 10-7-16 of 57 pages in length for
the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk
of the County of Canyon in the Third Judicial District.

Patricia J.
erry,
Court Reporter, CSR No. 653
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
December 20,

2016

Date
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